2020

On this historical day

Creating a new demographic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is detrimental

04 September 2020 | By Vasif Huseynov

Armenia’s illegal settlements in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan further complicate the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, writes Vasif Huseynov.

The growingly unstable and dangerously unpredictable situation in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions of the latter has been further aggravated by increasingly more provocations by the Armenian side.

Emboldened by the military support it enjoys from its external patrons, Armenia has even started attacking the units of the Azerbaijani army in the territories beyond the occupied region as exemplified in the July 2020 clashes between the two sides in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan.

In a few weeks following this escalation, Armenians made another provocative move by promoting illegal settlements in the occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and beyond that are recognized internationally as belonging to Azerbaijan.

On 5 August, after the explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, Armenian media reported a decision by the leader of Armenia’s subordinate regime in Nagorno-Karabakh Arayik Harutyunyan to immigrate Lebanese Armenians of 100 – 150 families.

Towards the end of August, 2 families have reportedly arrived in the region and been provided with necessary living conditions by the local authorities.

The Armenians living abroad are seen as the favourite people for this purpose, as local Armenians protest the proposals to allow the inflow of other nations to their strikingly monoethnic and remarkably nationalist society, even though this is supported by the government as a possible remedy to the domestic demographic crisis.

The immigration of Armenians based in foreign countries is part of Armenia’s policy to populate the occupied territories to consolidate the occupation and create a fait accompli for the future negotiations on the status of the region.

Bako Sahakyan, Harutyunyan’s predecessor, had determined the expansion of the settlements in the adjacent territories around Nagorno-Karabakh as a priority for 2017 – 2020. In 2018, for the first time, funds ($800,000) from the budget of the occupational regime were allocated to populate and develop new settlements in this region.

Azerbaijan has long warned that Armenia, violating the internationally-accepted laws and norms, including the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its Additional Protocols, builds settlements in the Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions, although according to the international law, states that seize a territory of another state by force are not allowed to populate that territory with their own citizens.

These concerns have been confirmed by the fact-finding missions of the OSCE in 2005 and 2010 and satellite imagery of the settlements. The fact-finding mission of the OSCE into the occupied territories between 30 January and 5 February reported evidence of the new settlements in the occupied territories.

The Co-Chairmen of OSCE Minsk Group, an international body tasked with the mediation of the resolution of the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict, emphasized that “prolonged continuation of this situation could lead to a fait accompli that would seriously complicate the peace process.”

They “discouraged any further settlement of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan” and “urged the parties to avoid changes in the demographic structure of the region, which would make more difficult any future efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.”

In a similar vein to the four resolutions (1993) of the UN Security Council that demanded immediate withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the call of the OSCE’s Minsk Group for the suspension of the settlements failed to affect the process.

The Minsk Group, in another fact-finding mission from 7 to 12 October 2010, discovered developments detrimental to the peace process including new illegal settlements by ethnic Armenians. Revealing the settlement of around 14,000 Armenians in the occupied seven districts of Azerbaijan, they urged Armenians “[…] to avoid any activities in the territories […] that would prejudice a final settlement or change the character of these areas.”

Azerbaijan sees the construction of new settlements in the occupied territories as “another testimony of the deliberate efforts towards creating a new demographic situation on the ground and preventing the return of the Azerbaijani displaced persons to their homes”.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan asserts that Armenia must be held accountable for its illegal activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan which has been named so by numerous international organizations, including the European Course on Human Rights.

The Court’s resolution in 2015 ruled that Armenia exercises effective control over the occupied region of Azerbaijan and is responsible for them under the European Human Rights Convention.

Nevertheless, the major states and international organizations that hold the power to affect the process and help the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories seem reluctant to take action. This happens against the backdrop of the loud criticism and practical measures by those states in the case of, for instance, the settlements of Israel in the Palestinian territories.

Not only do such inconsistent international policies and the maintenance of double standards threaten the international peace and security, but also ultimately legalize the illegal activities and encourage others to reach their unlawful objectives through the use of force and violation of international law and norms.

This is therefore important for all the states and international organizations to take a strong position against Armenia’s settlements in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and demand its leaders to put an end to the creeping expropriation of these territories.

ARMENIA–AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT USHERED INTO A MORE DANGEROUS AND UNSTABLE PERIOD

06 August 2020 | By Dr. Farid Shafiyev & Dr. Vasif Huseynov

The IIP published in July a blog written by Dr. Mher Sahakyan on the restarted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan about the contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not surprisingly, this comment from the „Armenian“ side was disputed form the “Azeri” side. As we are an institute for peace and do not want to be one sided, we gladly publish this reaction written by Dr Farid Shafiyev and Dr Vasif Huseynov (see below).

Some personal remarks by Hannes Swoboda, President of the IIP

When I was still a member of the European Parliament I visited several times Armenia and  Azerbaijan – especially as member of the EU Parliament’s Delegation to the South Caucasus. Looking at the changing rulers of Nagorno-Karabakh through history, there is no clear hint to whom this region should belong. So we did not take side in this conflict either. The fact is that the majority of its population is Armenian. But the fact is also that Armenia has still occupied several areas of Azerbaijan proper. 

During all our deliberations in the European Parliament we asked at least for the return of these areas to Azerbaijan. Of course, this return should be connected with assurances that no military activities should be started from the areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. But as I visited the refugees/displaced persons from that region, I was convinced that their return would be an important step towards peace. In addition, they could no longer be instrumentalized by some Azeri politicians. 

All our efforts to initiate and promote people to people contact failed, as they found much resistance – especially from the Azeri side. And all the talks and negotiations between the two countries and with support by third parties failed. I had often the impression, that both sides were not really interested in a solution, which, of course, could only be a compromise. As the IIP we would gladly invite speakers from both countries and, if possible, from Nagorno-Karabakh to discuss possible solutions and steps towards a settlement of this “unnecessary” conflict.

Armenia–Azerbaijan Conflict Ushered into a More Dangerous and Unstable Period

Dr. Farid Shafiyev & Dr. Vasif Huseynov

July 2020 marked one of the most intense escalations in the more than thirty-year-old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the occupied Azerbaijani territories – Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding regions. The sudden clashes, which occurred on July 12-14 on the state border between the two sides in the direction of the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan, geographically far from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, resulted in the loss of up to 20 military servicemen on both sides. The recent historical background of these clashes and the developments following them demonstrate that the two conflicting countries have entered a period that is likely to be more dangerous and unstable for the peace and security of the region.

Violent dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1980s, though it had roots back in the Soviet period, when Armenians consistently sought to have the Nagorno-Karabakh region separated from Soviet Azerbaijan and unified with Soviet Armenia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Armenia launched a full-scale military operation against Azerbaijan in 1992–94, which resulted in the occupation of almost 20% of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory. Notwithstanding the internationally mediated peace process since the ceasefire agreement established in May 1994, the two sides failed to reach a peace agreement. In the aftermath of the so-called Velvet Revolution of 2018, which brought Nikol Pashinyan to power in Armenia, a degree of optimism arrived at the negotiating table. In contrast to his predecessors, Prime Minister Pashinyan is not of Karabakh origin and is not associated with the war of the early 1990s. This was part of the reason why he was therefore expected to show more constructivism with regard to the negotiations brokered by the Minsk Group of the OSCE, co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France.

There were indeed a number of positive developments at the beginning of Pashinyan’s rule. In late 2018, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed on the establishment of a telephone hotline between the military commanders for the first time, and in January 2019 they agreed to take concrete measures to “prepare populations for peace.” These happened against the backdrop of a substantial decline in the number of casualty-causing incidents to a handful in 2019. These developments, on the one hand, denoted the importance of political will for de-escalation and, on the other hand, generated hope and favorable conditions for further agreements and an eventual breakthrough. 

These expectations, unfortunately, did not become reality, as an abrupt volte-face of Prime Minister Pashinyan caused a dramatic deterioration in the peace process and paved the way for the current escalation. Three decisive milestones can be marked in his policies that dealt serious blows to the negotiations and provoked the military confrontation.

First, in March 2019, Pashinyan and his government cast doubt on the internationally mediated negotiation process and attempted to change its format by bringing in representatives of the local regime in the occupied Karabakh region. This attempt was challenged not only by Azerbaijan but also by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. It is important to note that the founding documents of the Minsk Conference, dated March 24, 1992, defined the two parties to the negotiation – Armenia and Azerbaijan. Elected and other representatives from the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan will join the negotiation process only after consultation with and consent from all parties. This formula implied that, given some progress in the talks, both communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region – Armenian and Azerbaijani – would become involved, as clarified by the Minsk Group Chairman in a statement issued on September 15, 1992.

The second destructive move was made by the Armenian Prime Minister in the summer of 2019. In his address at the opening ceremony of the Pan-Armenian games that were held illegally in Khankandi, part of the Armenian-occupied internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan, on August 5, 2019, Pashinyan called for unification between Armenia and Karabakh, declaring “Karabakh is Armenia, period.” Breaking with the tradition of former Armenian governments that previously denied Yerevan’s control over the occupied regime established in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, he put the essence of the entire peace effort into question. Even Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia, Armenia’s ally within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), reacted to Pashinyan’s speech and highlighted that such statements “do not help the settlement of the conflict.”

Finally, the last major blow to the peace process was dealt in April 2020, when the Armenian government denied the existence of any documents on the negotiating table. This statement was made by the Foreign Ministry of Armenia in response to the remarks of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Addressing a videoconference organized by the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, Lavrov expressed support to the existing “firmly established format of negotiations” and described the draft documents on the agenda to be a “very important step in implementing the [United Nations] Security Council resolutions.” This caused particular concern in Armenia as the resolutions of the UN Security Council, adopted in 1993, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Armenian military forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. A month later, making yet another provocative move, the Armenian side held an inauguration ceremony, with Prime Minister Pashinyan present, for the new so-called president of the local regime in the city of Shusha in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh – a place of deep cultural significance to Azerbaijanis.

The July 12–14 escalation should not be viewed as unexpected against the background of this record low in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan since mid-2018. However, the clashes between the two sides took place in an unusual location, as the bone of contention between the two conflicting parties is occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories. A number of reasons have been mentioned by local and international observers attempting to explain the motivation behind this incident.

For many experts, the attack – directly along the state border between the two rival South Caucasus neighbors – was a deliberate move by the Armenian side to lay the ground for the involvement of the Moscow-led CSTO in the conflict. Notably, any hostilities in the Karabakh region itself or the surrounding Armenian-occupied areas do not fall under the jurisdiction of the alliance owing to the status of this area as part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories. In an attempt to invoke Article 4 of the CSTO Charter, which designates an attack on a member state as an attack against all members, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan held a phone conversation with CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas. A few hours after their talks, the secretary general announced an emergency meeting of the organization; however, that meeting was soon postponed indefinitely, for unknown reasons.

A plan to sever the connection between Azerbaijan and Europe was also assumed by some observers as part of the motivation leading to the July clashes. Importantly, Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district where the recent clashes took place is a region that hosts major energy pipelines (the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor) and transportation routes (the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the East–West Transport Corridor) connecting Azerbaijan with Europe through Georgia and Turkey. Any instability in this part of Azerbaijan would deal a serious blow to its connection with its Western partners, with overarching consequences for both sides. Therefore, the potential role of some third parties, who oppose the rise of Western influence into the South Caucasus, in the recent escalation on the border has been emphasized by some experts.

The escalation, unfortunately, did not remain limited to the clashes between the armed forces, but it spiraled into information warfare between the two nations and, more dangerously, spilled over into the diasporas in third countries. Most strikingly, as part of the disinformation campaign that Armenia waged against Azerbaijan, it was claimed that “Having so many casualties without territorial gains, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan threatened to launch a missile strike on the Armenian Metsamor nuclear power plant.”

This particular threat had, in fact, been made by a low-ranking official of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. However, there are two nuances that must be mentioned to get a clear understanding of the context and motives. First, the statement by the official of the Ministry of Defense was made in response to a question by a journalist who asked how Azerbaijan would reply if Armenia were to strike the Mingachevir Dam, the biggest dam in the entire Caucasus that would cause catastrophic humanitarian consequences to Azerbaijan if destroyed in a military attack. Contrary to the claims quoted above, therefore, this pronouncement was not made because of “so many casualties without territorial gains.” Second, the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan refuted the claim that Azerbaijan has plans to strike Armenia’s nuclear plant and emphasized that this threat was made by a low-ranking official and does not represent the official policy of Azerbaijan.

The attacks against Azerbaijani civilians in third countries were of even greater concern and need to be taken seriously. One such attack occurred in Los Angeles, a Californian city that hosts the largest Armenian community outside Armenia. More than 500 Armenian protestors faced off with an Azerbaijani group of much smaller size (less than 50 people) near the Azerbaijan Consulate General. The Los Angeles Police Department is currently investigating three hate crime and battery incidents after three people from the Azerbaijani group sustained non-life-threatening injuries. For the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Earle Litzenberger, there is irrefutable evidence that the provocation in Los Angeles was committed by aggressive Armenian demonstrators.

What is more, the recent developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan are extremely worrying as they are also an indication for future confrontations between the armed forces of the two countries and between civilians. The evident failure of the internationally mediated negotiations and the destructive dynamics in the region continue to preclude a breakthrough in the foreseeable future and keep peace as an inaccessible dream of the region’s people. This situation in the South Caucasus needs to be taken more seriously by all international organizations whose mission is to promote peace and non-violent conflict-resolution across the world as well as by all the major powers that can influence the process.

https://www.iipvienna.com/new-blog/2020/8/5/armeniaazerbaijan-conflict-ushered-into-a-more-dangerous-and-unstable-period

ANALYSIS – Why is Armenian diaspora resorting to aggression again?

06 August 2020 | By Dr. Cavid Veliev

Armenian diaspora no longer able to legitimize occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories or sell Armenia as “victim”

The skirmishes in Tovuz, on the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, led to confrontations between representatives of the diasporas of the two states overseas. Radical attitudes and attacks by the representatives of Armenians were particularly noticeable. The first large-scale attack happened in Los Angeles, the United States, also known as the capital of the Armenian diaspora with 500,000 Armenian residents. A large group of Armenians attacked and injured a much smaller group of Azerbaijanis in Los Angeles on July 21, the latter having gathered to peacefully protest the recent Armenian aggression on the border with Azerbaijan. According to the Los Angeles Police Department, detectives are investigating the assaults as a hate crime. Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los Angeles, sent a letter to Consul General of Azerbaijan in Los Angeles Nasimi Aghayev and condemned the assaults.

This incident was followed by a number of provocations staged against representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora and diplomatic missions in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Georgia, the Ukraine and Russia. On July 30, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan dismissed 13 employees of the Office of the Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs. According to the pro-Pashinyan news portal lragir.am, these dismissals were due to the latest string of assaults in the US and Europe.

After these events, experts began to discuss the reasons behind what seems to be a rebirth of radicalization within the Armenian diaspora and the resulting attacks. The debate revolves around three particular reasons: first, the radical ideology that continues to be fed into the perceptions of Armenian youth; second, the shattering of the image of Armenia as a “victimized” nation; and third, the Armenian government’s relations with the diaspora.

The spread of radical ideology in the Armenian diaspora passed through three stages. The first period started at the beginning of the 20th century. According to historical documents, during meetings in Yerevan in September and October 1919, the Armenian political party Tashnak decided to assassinate politicians, including Armenians from Turkey and Azerbaijan, as proposed by Armenian-American Shahan Natalie (born in the Ottoman Empire as Hagop der Hagopyan). As a result of this meeting, an assassination team was created, led by Shahan Natalie, Armen Garo, and Aron Sachaklian. The organization established for this purpose was named Nemesis. The Nemesis terror organization assassinated Azerbaijani Prime Minister Fetali Han Hoyski on June 19, 1920 in Tbilisi. Later, Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan Behbud Khan Javanshir was assassinated on July 18, 1921 in Istanbul by Nemesis member Misak Torlakian, who then fled to the United States and lived there to the end of his life.

The second period of the spread of radical ideology in the Armenian diaspora began in 1975. In this year, the diaspora established two organizations: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), both of which adopted terrorism against civilians as a strategy. Between 1975 and 1983, Armenian terrorist organizations perpetrated 161 bomb attacks, 77 people were killed as a result of the attacks perpetrated by these organizations, among them 31 Turkish diplomats. At that time, ASALA and JCAG were specified as terrorist groups by the United States. However, many Armenian intellectuals continued to celebrate the activities of ASALA and JCAG in their writings and hailed these terrorists as heroes.

Moreover, Armenian diaspora organizations continue to idealize these two organizations to Armenian youth as an exemplar. For example, on July 26, 2020 a number of Armenian churches organized religious ceremonies to commemorate the five “heroes” who gave their lives for the Armenian people. On July 27, an Armenian diaspora newspaper published in Los Angeles remembered the five Lisbon “heroes” who attacked the Turkish embassy in Lisbon in 1983. These so-called heroes killed two civilians, including the wife of a Turkish diplomat and a Portuguese police officer. Through such commemorations, Armenian youth are encouraged to emulate the ideology and actions of the terrorists.

The third period in the rebirth of radical ideology in the Armenian diaspora started in 1988 during the occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories by Armenia. In 1987, ASALA members dissolved their terrorist organization and came to Armenia, where they were welcomed as heroes. Upon their return, ASALA members also took an active part in the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by acting in cahoots with other terror organizations. Armenian terrorist groups not only operated in the occupied territories, but also attacked buses, metro stations, and other civilian locations in Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan, causing many deaths and injuries.

The second reason for the rebirth of radicalization in the Armenian diaspora today has to do with its declining influence. During the period 1988–1994, when Armenia occupied Azerbaijani lands, the Armenian diaspora worked to legitimize the occupation in the eyes of international public opinion. On Jan. 19-20, 1990, for example, the Soviet Union invaded Baku and attacked demonstrators demanding the resolution of certain social and human rights issues. Through misrepresentation by the Armenian diaspora, some newspapers in the West tried to form a lobby against Azerbaijan and portrayed the Soviet attacks as a “suppression of Islamists in Baku”. In 1992, at a time when Armenia continued to occupy Azerbaijan’s territories and just after the Khojaly genocide, the US Congress, under the influence of the Armenian diaspora, adopted “Section 907” against Azerbaijan. Ironically, Section 907 demanded that Azerbaijan stop the “aggression” against Armenia. A few months after the adoption of Section 907, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) demanding that Armenia withdraw its forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. These episodes from history highlight that during the 1990s, the Armenian diaspora formed a monopoly over the narrative against Azerbaijan.

However, after the 2000s, the Armenian diaspora started to lose its influence in this field. The first reason was related to the increasing activism on the part of Azerbaijan’s own diaspora. Stronger institutionalization and mobilization of Azerbaijani diaspora contributed greatly to the recognition of the Khojaly massacre as a genocide committed by Armenia by more than 10 countries in the world and nearly 20 states in the US. What’s more, despite the efforts of the Armenian diaspora to portray Azerbaijan as an aggressor, the international community began to recognize that Azerbaijani lands are in fact occupied by Armenia.

The third and final reason for the resurgence of radicalization relates to a policy pursued by the Armenian government. Pashinyan, who desires to enlist the support of the diaspora in Armenia’s domestic policy struggle, also wants to use the diaspora as a foreign policy tool and therefore wants to please the diaspora by adopting a populist and nationalist policy. During his first visit to the US, Pashinyan went to Los Angeles and made a speech to the Armenian diaspora there, in which he thanked them for supporting him during the “Velvet Revolution”. Subsequently, Pashinyan also asked them to support his government economically. In addition, Armenia’s Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan, who was appointed by Pashinyan, threatened Azerbaijan, during a speech to the Armenian diaspora in New York, with occupying new territories. Thus, speeches by officials of the new government are also greatly contributing to the rebirth of radical attitudes among the Armenian diaspora.

The Armenian government supports this reemerging radicality in the Armenian diaspora as the latter is no longer able to perform its assigned roles through conventional lobbying activities. It has also become largely evident that the Armenian diaspora is also no longer able to legitimize the occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories or sell Armenia as a “victim”. As a result, the diaspora, in its desperation, has started to adopt radical methods to make its voice heard once again.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-why-is-armenian-diaspora-resorting-to-aggression-again-/1933553

Battle over perceptions: upturned reality

06 August 2020 | By Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva

The protection of minority rights is one of the best-explored cross-disciplinary issues in the social sciences and humanities. A vast literature exists that deals with this subject from different angles, including those of international law, sociology, history, cultural anthropology, political science, and so on. According to Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a minority is “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members— being nationals of the State-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”1 .

History provides many examples of times when minority groups were at the epicentre of internal strife and ethnic conflicts. They are typically mobilized by various irredentist or separatist movements. Sometimes, kin-states also assist them in their struggles. Basques and Catalans in Spain, Scots and Catholics of Northern Ireland in Great Britain, Abkhazs and South Ossetians in Georgia, and ethnic Armenians of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in Azerbaijan are well-known examples of such minority groups. In fact, it was the irredentist Karabakh movement, which, in 1988 in Armenia and the NKAO, started advocating for the unification of the NKAO with Soviet Armenia, that was behind the mobilization of Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-nationalists who demanded the transfer of this mainly Armenian-dominated region from the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia.

Despite the rejection of the NKAO’s appeal by Soviet Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-nationalists did not relinquish their claims and eventually became locked in a tense stand-off with Azerbaijan. Nor did neighbouring Soviet Armenia’s stance help. In fact, when the Soviet leadership attempted in vain to deal with this conflict, Soviet Armenia’s continuous support of the Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-nationalists made its resolution impossible.

After Azerbaijan and Armenia regained their independence in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Armenia continued its meddling in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. In order to avoid accusations of irredentist claims, this kin-state, together with its kindred in Nagorno-Karabakh, started to demand the right of people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination and separation from Azerbaijan. United around the Karabakh issue, representatives of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S.A., France, and other states also played an instrumental role in providing the necessary political, economic, financial, and information support for the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh ethno-nationalists.

The Armenian Diaspora has, over the years, also worked very hard to misrepresent the nature of the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. One of the successes of this policy was the adoption by the U.S. Congress in October 1992 of the notorious Section 9072 of the Freedom Support Act (FSA), initiated by the Armenian-American lobby in retaliation to Azerbaijan cutting off the rail route that carried supplies and fuel to Armenia in 1992. As a result of this amendment, Azerbaijan became the only post-Soviet state not to receive direct aid from the United States government to facilitate economic and political stability. However, perhaps nobody in the U.S. Congress knew, when they adopted section 907 of FSA, that by that time Armenian armed forces had already committed the Khojaly massacre on the night of February 25–26, 1992; 3 captured Shusha, a main city of the Azerbaijani-populated administrative district within the former NKAO, on May 8, 1992; and seized Lachin, the first adjacent Azerbaijani district located between Armenia and the former NKAO, on May 18, 1992. Therefore, “Armenians were aggressively at war with Azerbaijanis who considered it national suicide to provide supplies to neighbours that were carrying out military action against them”4.

There is also independent opinion that “the US argument is invalid, based upon a misconstruction of the conflict, because “as a matter of fact, Azerbaijan has the right to protect itself against a country with which it considers itself at war. Whether Armenia accepts this claim is irrelevant”5.

Thus, it is crystal clear that, owing to the greater Armenian institutional presence in Washington, D.C., and a lack of serious opposition from the Azerbaijani side, along with the fact that American national interests were not perceived as being at stake at that moment, the Armenian-American lobby was able to successfully frame the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in line with their homeland’s interest and transform Azerbaijan’s attempts to reassert control over its territory into an act of ‘aggression’ by Azerbaijanis and combine it with the threat of a ‘second genocide’ against the Armenians. 6

When a ceasefire agreement was signed in May 1994, the facts on the ground were quite the opposite. In fact, aggression by Armenians was committed against Azerbaijanis. Not only was close to one-fifth of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, consisting of nearly all the territory of the former NKAO and additional seven adjacent Azerbaijani administrative districts (Lachin, Kelbajar, Agdam, Fizuly, Jabrail, Kubatly, and Zangilan) that had never been populated by Armenians occupied, but also the entire Azerbaijani population of these territories was ethnically cleansed by the Armenian armed forces. More than 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed and around one million displaced in the course of this armed conflict’, 7.

The OSCE has been involved in the mediation efforts of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh since March 1992. “The Minsk Group, the activities of which have become known as the Minsk Process, spearheads the OSCE’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation, and the United States”8.

However, throughout the years, the mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group were reactive, rather than proactive. Despite the fact that co-chairs of the Minsk Group more than once declared the status quo unacceptable they have mainly focused on preventing an escalation of the conflict, rather than making a resolution happen. Therefore, it is unsurprising that in his interview on 9 July 2020, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev while giving a broad insight into the settlement process of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh accused the OSCE Minsk Group for its inaction on Armenia’s illegal occupation of Azerbaijani lands. According to the President this conflict must be resolved within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

“The establishment of a second Armenian state on Azerbaijani lands will never be allowed. All occupied lands must be liberated from the occupiers, and Azerbaijani citizens must return to the lands of their ancestors. This is a principled position, and the world community supports this position”9.

Indeed, the leading world and regional powers and international organizations recognize the territorial integrity and the inviolability of Azerbaijan’s borders. However, they oppose any attempts to use any sanction against Armenia, merely paying lip service to the readiness to act as guarantors of a final settlement in case Armenia and Azerbaijan find mutually acceptable compromises on their own. In fact, owing to the lack of political will of the international community, the four legally binding UN Security Council resolutions (specifically, 822, 853, 874 and 884) adopted in 1993 demanding full and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan have not yet been implemented by Armenia. Thus, only ethnic Armenians live in the decimated Azerbaijani towns and villages of the former NKAO and the above-mentioned seven districts at present.

At the same time, the separatist regime created in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which has not been recognized by any other state, including its kin-state Armenia, has been working very hard, together with Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, toward the illegal resettlement of thousands of Armenians in the occupied Azerbaijani territories as well as the implementation of illegal activities and infrastructure projects there. They have also been pursuing a policy of distorting the origin and the use of Azerbaijani monuments in the occupied territories. In fact, deliberate destruction and pillage of the cultural heritage as well as religious and historical monuments is a part of their battle over perception.

“Almost all once Azerbaijani-populated towns, villages, and even streets, have been renamed after the occupation, and Armenianized, in a vicious attempt to erase any traces of Azerbaijanis’ age old presence in Karabakh” 10.

Thus, this ugly reality, which emerged as a result of the use of military force and the expulsion of Azerbaijani inhabitants in violation of many principles of public international law, as well as international humanitarian law, is a vivid manifestation of the irresponsible demand of Nagorno Karabakh ethno-nationalists for self-determination (in fact, for secession). What nobody takes into consideration is that the implementation of their so-called right to self-determination led to the abuse of the rights of the around 700,000 Azerbaijani IDPs, – former inhabitants of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts. In fact, these people forcibly expelled from their places of origin are the Azerbaijanis of historic Karabakh region’ 11.

Geographically, this region can be divided into mountainous Karabakh, which consists of the highlands of the Karabakh Range of the Lesser Caucasus, and lowland Karabakh, located between the rivers Kura and Araks. Unlike Armenians, Azerbaijanis have never historically differentiated between the lowland and mountainous parts of the historic Karabakh region, but have perceived it “as a single geographical, economic and cultural space, where they have always been politically and demographically dominant”. Moreover, many Azerbaijanis considered the creation in 1923 of the NKAO within ‘artificial’ (i.e. previously non-existent) borders an attempt to secure “an Armenian majority region within Azerbaijan as part of the Soviet/Russian policy of divide and rule” 12.

According to the last USSR census of 1989, the population of NKAO residing in the mountainous part of the historic Karabakh region consisted of 189,100 people, of whom 145,500 were Armenians (76.9 percent), 40,688 Azerbaijanis (21.5 percent), and 2,912 Russians and other nationalities (1.6 percent).13

Azerbaijani inhabitants were a minority within NKAO; however, the population of the other mountainous and lowland parts of the Karabakh region was predominantly Azerbaijani before this armed conflict. Today, the entire historic Karabakh region, which includes the territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent districts, is under occupation by Armenian military forces. The most vulnerable and affected by this conflict Azerbaijani inhabitants of these territories are the direct victims of the Armenian aggression. Their voices, it seems, have not been heard very often over the years. Their views and aspirations, as well as their human stories, have not been illuminated in the glossy magazines or famous international television channels. Seemingly, they have not been in the limelight of the international media. The fundamental rights of these innocent civilians, forcibly expelled from their homeland, have been violated for almost three decades. Azerbaijanis from Karabakh “have not been able to exercise their basic human rights and return to their homes. Instead, internally displaced, they are scattered across Azerbaijan, hoping for peace and coexistence with their Armenian neighbours as they had before” 14.

However, the recent outbreak of violence that happened in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 12-14 July 2020 proves once more the dangerous destructive potential of this unresolved conflict. According to Hikmat Hajiev, head of the foreign affairs department of Azerbaijan’s presidential administration by committing this border provocation Armenia tried to derail the negotiation process by all means, evade responsibility for the occupation of Azerbaijani territories – Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions and create a new source of tension and conflict in the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan and involve the political-military organization of which it is a member, into this conflict’, 15.

Needless to say, that Armenia is the only state in South Caucasus that is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-led military bloc and in fact, after the fighting broke out, Armenian officials appealed to the CSTO to get involved’, 16.

However, despite the fact that CSTO announced that it would convene an extraordinary session on July 13, this meeting was cancelled later on. One might assume from this logic that there is again an attempt to mislead the international community and misrepresent the truth.

Therefore, as a very first step, an international reaction is urgently needed to put an end to Armenia’s “syndrome of impunity.” First of all, consolidated actions should be agreed upon to eliminate the consequences of the Armenian occupation of close to one-fifth of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan and clear-cut arrangements should be made to ensure a safe and dignified return of the expelled Azerbaijanis of the historic Karabakh region to their places of origin. Next, the solution to this conflict undoubtedly lies in coexistence and cooperation, both between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between the Karabakh Armenians and the Karabakh Azerbaijanis. The international community should help in this context and promote civil initiatives involving direct contacts not only between Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives, but also between Karabakh Armenians and Karabakh Azerbaijanis’, 17.

Finally, an equal and just approach should be demonstrated by the international community to all the inhabitants of the historic Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, irrespective of their ethnic origins. Thus, the final status of this region, to be defined within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan, as well as security measures equally acceptable to both Armenian and Azerbaijani inhabitants of the historic Karabakh region, should be carefully elaborated within a comprehensive solution to this conflict.

http://thelondonpost.net/battle-perceptions-upturned-reality/?fbclid=IwAR3GqrTqKeoGWgg80NwO7tNM_zcy9UEMMrfb76FzNFRY0TYGY4WEOh_bTfI

Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: walking a tightrope

07 August 2020 | By Foreign Policy News

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has dragged on for about three decades. The very recent escalation along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the direction of Tovuz district once again became a terrifying proof to the fragility of the situation. The ceasefire that is in place since 1994 is very tenuous and the notion of “peace” is often manipulated by the leadership of Armenia to solidify occupation, and maintain the dangerous status-quo. “Peace” without justice will always be akin to walking a tightrope of the next violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbajan has been lasting for three decades without a progress on the part of the mediators to achieve a fair and durable conflict resolution. The active military hostilities that happened in 1988-1994 resulted in the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan by Armenia. The negotiation process between the two countries has continued since the establishment of the OSCE Minsk Group in 1992, that is co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia. However, the solution to the conflict has so far remained elusive and the frequent violations of the ceasefire has become habitual.

Although in 2019 relatively less ceasefire violations happened along the Line of Contact between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the year also did not see any progress in the peace negotiations. Furthermore, the new leadership of Armenia led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly demonstrated hostile rhetoric firstly, through infamous declaration during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi on August 5, 2019, when he said that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all”. Later, through holding the so-called “presidential and parliamentary elections” in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region and organizing an “inauguration ceremony” of the puppet regime in Shusha – the city of immense cultural significance for Azerbaijan – Pashinyan regime dealt another blow to the peace process. It was clear that these moves added up to the hostile build-up. The Tovuz provocation on 12-14 July was therefore the logical conclusion of the downward trend in the peace process and the accompanying belligerence by Armenia.

On 12-14 July, 2020 border clashes between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan made headlines again. Armenia embarked on a military assault, this time not along the Line of Contact between Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, but on Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the direction of Tovuz district of Azerbaijan. As a result of military hostilities, the worst since the four-day war in 2016, Azerbaijan lost more than 10 servicemen, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian. While Armenia reported that four soldiers were dead and 36 wounded,Azerbaijani sides reported about killing more than 100 Armenian personnel, and destroying military equipment of Armenia. International actors, including the European UnionOSCE Minsk GroupUnited NationsUnited States, and the Russian Federation called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. As of today, although the situation is more or less stable, Azerbaijan expects provocationsby Armenia at any time along the border.

There are several motives that support the idea that Armenia has effectively embarked on such a provocation on the front. One of them is related to the efforts of incumbent Armenian leadership to distract the public’s attention from its failures internally and externally. Armenia’s economic problems are looming large, particularly now with COVID-19 sweeping across the country and resulting in the highest per capita daily infections among the three countries of the South Caucasus region. Azerbaijan’s economic development, increasing international stance and continuous success of its foreign policy have generated discussions that it might qualify to be named as a middle power on a global scale.

Azerbaijan’s increasing success threatens Armenia and its regional ambitions.

Another motive behind Armenia’s provocation in Tovuz is related to its attempt to invoke Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against Azerbaijan. Armenia is the only CSTO member in the South Caucasus. The very article 4 of the CSTO Charter states: “if one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty”, which potentially duty bounds CSTO members to protect Armenia in case the latter is attacked. Against Armenia’s expectations CSTO, however, merely confined itself to issuing a declaration calling the parties to “immediate ceasefire”.

Last, but not the least, Armenia aimed at targeting critical energy and transport infrastructure, including the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan, Baku-Supsa oil, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad that are implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners and pass through the famous “Ganja Gap”, thereby also jeopardizing the energy security of the greater European continent.

But the two countries have not always warred with each-other. Armenians and Azerbaijanis have lived side-by-side in the Caucasus for many decades, have a shared history, and many similarities in anthropological and cultural domains. Intercultural interaction, marriages were normal state of things between Armenian and Azerbaijan population in the region. After the arrival of Tsarist Russia into this soil in the 18th century and in line with its “divide and rule” policy, the Tsarist regime employed population transfers as a tool to increase the number of Christians in the region, thus changing the demographic balance and creating potential hotspots for ethnic conflict. This entailed transfer of Armenians from neighboring countries (Turkey, Iran, etc.) to Azerbaijani territories, including in the territories that today constitute the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan both became independent in 1918 – 1920 before being annexed this time by Soviet Bolsheviks and became fellow Soviet Socialist republics until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The two nations enjoyed mostly peaceful and cooperative relations during their common history in the Soviet Union. However, when the latter was on the brink of collapse at the end of the 80s, the emerging modern Armenian statehood was unfortunately influenced by Armenian nationalist and radical ideology, who through employing violence as a method to achieve their ultimate goals also prioritized acquisition of new territories at the expense of its neighbor – Azerbaijan – through utilization of the ethnic card created by the Tsarist Russia. Unfortunately, politicization and instrumentalization by Armenian nationalists of the artificially created ethnic issue between Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the Tsarist Russia resulted in the so-far unresolved conflict between modern Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, Armenia can still turn the tide of violent nationalism and opt for more cooperative and peaceful existence with their immediate neighbor Azerbaijan. To achieve this, it needs to de-occupy the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan, i.e. the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts in compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions (822, 953, 874, 884) and other relevant international norms, principles and documents, thus allowing the return of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Azerbaijani to their places of origin. Peace should start with bringing justice to those who have been stripped of their basic rights to live in their motherlands. Paying lip service to peace as is often done by Armenia’s leadership, will bring neither peace, nor justice. Ultimately, “peace” without justice will always be akin to walking a tightrope of the next violent conflict.

Azerbaijan general among troops killed in Armenia border clash

14 July 2020, by BBC News

Azerbaijan says one of its generals and five other officers have been killed in a third day of fighting with Armenian forces on the countries’ border.

An Azeri private also died, bringing the Azeri death toll so far to 11. Armenia says four of its troops – two of them officers – were killed.

Both countries were part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in the 1990s.

They fought a bloody war over a mountainous territory, in a dispute that remains unresolved.

Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but is controlled by ethnic Armenians.

This clash, however, took place north of this disputed territory.

Azerbaijan says heavy fighting is continuing in Tovuz district, bordering on Tavush in north-eastern Armenia.

Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Russian President Vladimir Putin, said Russia was “deeply concerned” about the outbreak of violence and was willing to mediate.

“We urge both parties to show restraint and to comply with their obligations under the ceasefire.”

A US state department release on Monday said the country “condemns in the strongest terms the violence along the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border” and called on both sides to stop the fighting and abide by the ceasefire.

What’s happening on the border?

Both sides accuse each other of shelling civilian areas on the border.

Azerbaijan’s defence ministry said a 76-year-old man was killed in the village of Agdam, by Armenian shelling.

Earlier the ministry said four Azeri troops had been killed in clashes on Sunday and Monday, involving tanks and artillery.

Meanwhile, Armenia accused Azerbaijan of shelling the town of Berd.

Azerbaijan’s military said it had destroyed an Armenian fortification and artillery and had inflicted casualties on “hundreds” of Armenian troops. Armenia denied suffering any casualties on that scale, but reported several wounded besides the two officers killed.

Among the six Azeri officers killed were Maj-Gen Polad Hashimov and Col Ilgar Mirzayev.

Armenia named its dead officers as Maj Garoush Hambardzumyan and Capt Sos Elbakyan. Later the defence ministry said two Armenian sergeants had been killed too.

Gas supplies to three Armenian villages were cut when some local pipelines were damaged by shelling, Gazprom Armenia said.

At an emergency meeting on Monday, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said: “Armenia’s political and military leadership will bear the entire responsibility for the provocation.”

Armenia, however, accused its neighbour of “using artillery in an attack aimed at capturing [Armenian] positions”.

“This aggression against the security of the civilian population of Armenia will receive a proportionate response, for which the Azerbaijani side bears full responsibility,” an Armenia foreign ministry spokeswoman said in a statement.

A collapse in diplomacy

 By Rayhan Demytrie, BBC Caucasus correspondent

The escalation in fighting comes just days after Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev criticised international mediators conducting peace negotiations with Armenia, describing the process as “meaningless”. He also accused Armenia of dragging its feet in order to maintain the status quo.

Azerbaijan is frustrated that after nearly three decades there has still been no progress towards settling the conflict over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the return of seven adjacent Azeri territories currently under Armenian control.

Known to Armenians as Artsakh, the self-proclaimed republic in Nagorno-Karabakh has been insisting on its right to self-determination.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan proposed including the separatist government in peace negotiations with Azerbaijan. But that is unacceptable to Baku, which says the dispute is with Armenia alone.

The sides accuse each other of starting the latest flare-up, and all eyes are now on Russia. It helped negotiate a ceasefire in 2016 after the so-called “April War” – in which some 200 soldiers and civilians were killed, and the two sides came close to all-out war.

What’s the history?

The two ex-Soviet republics in the Caucasus fought a bitter war in the 1990s, when Armenia backed the majority ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. A fragile ceasefire was agreed in 1994.

Tensions last flared into conflict in 2016, with the countries clashing over the disputed territory for four days. The BBC reported from both sides of the fighting.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has long been trying to mediate a settlement of the conflict, with diplomats from France, Russia and the US – making up the OSCE Minsk Group – trying to build on the ceasefire.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53402476

Azerbaijan: Cross-border clashes continue in Tovuz region

14 Jul 2020, 05:24 PM UTC. By www.garda.com

Ten killed as cross-border clashes continue for the third day in Tovuz region on July 14; further fighting possible in near term

TIMEFRAME expected from 7/13/2020, 11:00 PM until 7/16/2020, 10:59 PM (Asia/Baku).

COUNTRY/REGION Tovuz

Event

At least ten people have been killed as cross-border clashes between Azeri and Armenian forces continued for a third consecutive day in the Tovuz region on Tuesday, July 14. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense stated seven Azeri troops, including a major-general and colonel, were killed whilst the Armenian government stated that a major and a captain had been killed skirmishing between the two forces. At least one civilian was also killed in the fighting. The Armenian Foreign Ministry also stated that shelling had targeted the town of Berd and that they had destroyed Azeri positions in retaliatory fire. The Azerbaijan government claimed to have killed a number of Armenian troops and destroyed military equipment. Clashes have been ongoing in the area since Sunday, July 12.

Further clashes in the area are possible in the near term.

Context

Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia have a long-standing dispute over the possession of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to some 150,000 inhabitants (mostly ethnic Armenians) and located in the west of Azerbaijan. This issue has fueled tensions between the two countries since 1988; some 30,000 people were killed in fighting from 1990 to 1994. The two countries declared another ceasefire in April 2016 after the region experienced four days of violent clashes that left hundreds dead. Tensions between the two countries remain high.

Advice

Western governments generally advise their citizens against all travel to Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azerbaijan-Armenia border. Those in Azerbaijan are advised to monitor developments to the situation, and adhere to instructions issued by local authorities and their home governments.

https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/359586/azerbaijan-cross-border-clashes-continue-in-tovuz-region-july-14-update-2

Waging another War against Azerbaijan is not a panacea, or why Armenia should stop its provocation

14 July 2020 – 11:40 | By Dr.Esmira Jafarova

Cease-fires are never meant to last forever and perpetuate the results of armed aggression and ethnic cleansing. Ceasefires are meant to achieve a temporary lull in military hostilities between warring parties with expectations that it should serve as a launch pad for achievement of lasting political solution to conflicts while easing the hardships of people hit by conflicts.

This also holds true in regard to Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, well into its third decade, unresolved so far, trapped in the notoriously ineffective negotiation process since 1997 and equally notorious and tenuous cease-fire in place since 1994. Before continuing with the most recent bloody developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which is the purpose of this article, let me utter a word with regard to the ceasefires in the COVID-19 context.

In some conflict-torn parts of the world ceasefires are often seen as an absolute necessity for humanitarian purposes and alleviating the sufferings of ordinary population. The call for global ceasefires amid COVID-19 voiced by the United Nations Secretary General  António Guterres recently, which was supported by the recent United Nations Security Council resolution 2532 on 1 July, also mostly carried this purpose, to unify global efforts to curb COVID-19 in the most vulnerable parts of the world. The resolution specifically called upon “..all parties to armed conflicts to engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause for at least 90 consecutive days, to enable the safe, unhindered and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance, and provision of related services by impartial humanitarian actors…”.

This call by the United Nations Secretary General António Guterres  was also supported by the Republic of Armenia, the Foreign Minister of which in a letter sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations reiterated that

“…international support is equally important for those who  have become vulnerable as a result of conflicts….”

If only these words were buttressed up by the deeds. Amid the raging waves of pandemics in the South Caucasus, in Armenia specifically, which is the hardest hit state among the three, the latter chose to divert international and domestic attention as well as criticism from its mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis.

On 12-14 July, 2020 Armenia again violated the ceasefire, this time not along the line of contact between Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, but on Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the direction of Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, having initiated military onslaught using artillery, tanks, grenade launchers and all sorts of military equipment. The attack that started at night and intermittently continued through the morning hours was finally staved off by Azerbaijani Armed Forces, which as of this writing has lost its seven servicemen, including the two high ranking officials – one major-general and one colonel.

The death of at least one civilian is also reported. Exact number of the losses on Armenian side has not been revealed, however, social network users were registered reporting possible death of about 30 Armenian soldiers or maybe more on 13 July 2020. On 14 July, Azerbaijani side reported about killing more than 100 personnel, and destroying military equipment of Armenia. International actors, including the European UnionOSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, United States, and the Russian Federation called for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

This unwanted escalation of hostilities along the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, although expected, still does nothing but leaves one flabbergasted. The whole world, including Armenia and Azerbaijan is fighting COVID-19 in an effort to save as many of their citizens as possible alongside their economy.

As I also noted above, Armenia previously supported the calls by the United Nations Secretary General for temporary lull in military activities globally. How does this support for no-military action then correlates with Armenia’s another blatant violation of the ceasefire? The ceasefire that is not meant to perpetuate the fact of occupation of the Azerbaijani territories, but to bring the parties, especially Armenia to the negotiation table to pursue meaningful – yes, meaningful! – negotiations. The ceasefire that unfortunately so far been manipulated infinite times by Armenia to get away with its occupationist and expansionist policy and its endless attempts to create a veneer of engagement in negotiations that have long hit a major snag due to its own unconstructive position.

Many analysts concur that Armenia’s genuine purpose in conducting such a flagrant violation of the ceasefire, especially on the front was an attempt to invoke Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which Armenia is the only member in the South Caucasus, against Azerbaijan. Such an attempt is also synchronized with the last-ditch efforts of current Armenian leadership to divert the attention from its own failures both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, the COVID-19 situation in Armenia is very disheartening with largest per capita rate of daily infections and death in the region. Its economy is crumbling and foreign allowances are becoming scarce. The domestic base of Pashinyan regime is also shattering with opposition forces ramping up their resistance against the backdrop of what they perceive as a failed delivery on the promise of “flourishing Armenia” that Pashinyan was ardently touting during his election campaign.

Internationally, recently there has been quite a portion of disillusionment for Armenia too. Azerbaijan’s increased activism on international front and continuous success of its foreign policy, especially during the recent years that have elevated it from a mere small state in the South Caucasus to qualifying as a middle power on a global scale, does not obviously go unnoticed in Armenia. This bothers Armenia. Otherwise, no common sense can explain the fact that Armenia became the only state in the entire world that spoke against the summoning of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly related to COVID-19 at the initiative of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ilham Aliyev. This very initiative was supported by more than 130 members of the United Nations, including the states of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Special Session is convened on July 10 with modalities currently being negotiated.

In a surprisingly predictable manner Armenia sent and official letter of rejection of Azerbaijan’s initiative. This is when we all are struggling with the unprecedented health crisis of our times. This is when Armenia is one of the hardest COVID-19-hit states. This is when we all need unity, cooperation and support to the most vulnerable. This is why the United Nations Secretary General called for 90 day ceasefires against the backdrop of COVID-19. This is why United Nations Security Council after months of deliberations and disagreements finally adopted its first resolution on COVID-19. And this is why, Armenia’s actions and its belligerence, openly flouting the international norms and principles and continuous opting for unconstructive and petulant foreign policy, especially in these unprecedented times, does not make sense.

Attacking Azerbaijan as was just done on 12-14 July, 2020, and jeopardizing the lives of both Azerbaijani and Armenian servicemen as well as other potential innocent lives, especially in these difficult times, is not a panacea to Armenia’s lingering problems and failures. This might shift attention in a short while, but will not deliver the “expected” results in the long run. The sooner Armenia’s leadership realizes this, the more chances its might still have to deliver on its promise of “flourishing Armenia” and do a better job in saving its people from COVID-19 and the associated problems.

Lessons learned from ongoing clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan

14 July 2020 – 11:47 | By Vasif Huseynov

Armenia’s sudden attack on its border with Azerbaijan in recent days testifies to Armenia’s intention to draw Russia more extensively into its conflict with Azerbaijan, writes Vasif Huseynov.

On 12 July, a series of clashes started on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border after the former launched a sudden attack against the position of Azerbaijan’s armed forces with heavy artillery.

This has been the first major escalation between the sides since the April War of 2016 and particularly since Nikol Pashinyan took over the political leadership in Armenia in mid-2018.

Azerbaijan’s ministry of defence has already reported the loss of four Azerbaijani soldiers while the Armenian side has not reported any death which is disputed by local and international observers considering the intense and extensive level of fighting between the two sides.

For an outside observer, the sudden escalation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan might seem unexpected at this particular time, as both sides have been hit hard by the pandemic.

However, the recent development in the occupied regions of Azerbaijan, including a highly provocative visit of Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan to the historical city of Shusha on 21 May to participate in the so-called inauguration of a new leader of the occupational regime made the situation very tense.

The evolving event offers a number of conclusions that should be drawn for the existing situation and future prospects of the conflict between the two.

First and foremost, it has demonstrated that Armenia does not plan to limit its occupation to the already occupied territories of Azerbaijan and has the intention to use every single opportunity to take control over more areas.

Having launched the attack in the region that has no direct link with the Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding areas, Armenia has sought to expand the area of intense mutual confrontations which they hoped to allow them to take more territories under control.

This was blatantly confirmed by the Minister of Defence of Armenia, Davit Tonoyan, who declared that the Armenian armed forces are instructed to “occupy new advantageous positions” if the Azerbaijani side makes any provocations.

Secondly, Armenia’s sudden attack on its border with Azerbaijan, i.e. not on the line of contact surrounding the occupied territories of Azerbaijan testifies Armenia’s intention to draw Russia more extensively in its conflict with Azerbaijan.

Armenia hoped that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) would stand with Armenia and support its war against Azerbaijan, as the charter of the organization pronounces the principle of “an attack against one is considered an attack against all”.

Towards this end, Armenia quickly albeit unsuccessfully attempted to push for a special session of the CSTO which was apparently not supported by other members as it has been declared that would not take place.

Third, the sudden escalation of the conflict which would quickly spiral into full-scale war as Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation did not rule out once again confirms that Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict is not a frozen one and runs the risk of turning into a regional catastrophe if not resolved shortly and peacefully.

This is of great importance for the extra-regional powers to take note that any negligence towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s call for the restoration of its internationally-recognized borders further deteriorates the situation and has the potential to lead sides into an all-out war with grave repercussions for the two conflicting sides and the wider region.

Last but not least, the recent escalation has indubitably shown that the imitation of negotiations between the sides over the last few years due to Armenia’s abuse of the peace process to prolong the status-quo and consolidate its control over the occupied region must stop, and its leaders should be pressured into substantive negotiations by the international community.

Importantly, most international organizations and states have recently shared Azerbaijan’s concern more vigorously and called Armenia to respect the international law and norms.

For example, on 10 June 2020, reacting to the construction of a road that will directly connect Armenia and the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region, the members of the European Parliament – the Chair of the delegation Marina Kaljurand, the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Armenia Traian Băsescu and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Azerbaijan Željana Zovko – have issued a joint statement and characterized this as a violation of the international law.

Concluding that the project is an attempt to “consolidate the illegal occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories”, the statement urged “the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan to conscientiously take their obligations in negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the conflict within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan”.

This principled position must be a role model for all other international institutions and states, and Armenia should be pressured into immediate substantive talks, otherwise the world will likely have to experience another humanitarian tragedy amidst the already troubled challenges posed by other interstate conflicts, economic crises and the global pandemic.

“Armenia – Azerbaijan Conflict Escalates with Intense Border Confrontation

July 14, 2020 05:45 PM | By Vasif Huseynov

On July 12, the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated into a major military confrontation along the state border straddling Azerbaijan’s Tovuz and Armenia’s Tavush regions (Jam-news, July 12). The clashes, involving heavy artillery as well as aerial drones, resulted in the deaths of several military personnel and civilians along with the destruction of infrastructure in the border region. On July 13, it was reported that the two sides also fought along the border in Azerbaijan’s Nakchivan exclave, which is nestled between Turkey, Iran and Armenia (Mod.gov.az, July 13). As of July 14, press accounts state that seven Azerbaijani service members, including a major general and a colonel, were killed, while Armenia has reported the loss of two military officers (Report.azHetq.am, July 14).

The Armenian Ministry of Defense asserted that the clashes started with a provocation by the Azerbaijani side on July 12. A spokesperson for the ministry, Shushan Stepanyan, reported on her Facebook page that “[a]n Azerbaijani jeep, for reasons unknown to us, attempted to violate the state border of Armenia in the area of Tavush,” adding, “After a warning by the Armenian side, the enemy soldiers left the vehicle and returned to their position. Stepanyan claimed that, around an hour later, “Azerbaijani soldiers, using artillery fire, attempted to seize our outpost but were pushed back, taking casualties” (Facebook.com/shushanstepanyan, July 12).

In a phone call with Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, the personal representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office, Armenian Minister of Defense Davit Tonoyan declared that his country’s Armed Forces had been instructed to “occupy new advantageous positions” if the Azerbaijani side attempts any further provocations (Twitter.com/ArmeniaMODTeam, July 13).

In turn, the assistant to the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan on foreign policy, Hikmat Hajiyev, accused the Armenian side of suddenly launching an initial attack on the positions of Azerbaijani forces, declaring, “The armed forces of Armenia had flagrantly violated the ceasefire regime and used artillery mounts to fire on the positions of Azerbaijan’s armed forces in the direction of Tovuz district” (Azertag, July 12).

For Polad Bülbüloğlu, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the Russian Federation, it does not matter who started the recent skirmishes, “the question is why does it occur?” Not ruling out the possibility the recent incident could lead to full-scale warfare, Bülbüloğlu asserted that this happens “[b]ecause the territories of Azerbaijan are occupied. Because foreign troops forcefully keep the territory of Azerbaijan. I am not shy and say that it is time to resolve this conflict on the basis of international law, and international law is completely on the Azerbaijani side” (Govoritmoskva.ru, July 14).

For Azerbaijani experts, the attack directly along the state border between the two rival South Caucasus neighbors is a deliberative move by the Armenian side to lay the ground for the involvement of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the conflict. Notably, any hostilities in the Karabakh region itself and surrounding Armenian-occupied areas does not fall under the jurisdiction of the alliance due to the status of this area as part of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories (Hafta.az, July 14).

In an attempt to invoke Article 4 of the CSTO Charter, which designates an attack on a member state as an attack against all members, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan held a phone conversation with CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas (Mfa.am, July 13). A few hours after their talks, the secretary general announced an emergency meeting of the organization; however, that meeting was soon postponed indefinitely, to the disillusionment of the Armenians (Minval.az, July 13).

Multiple states and international organizations have called on the two warring sides to exercise restraint and observe the ceasefire regime established in 1994 with Russia’s mediation. In its statement, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed “serious” concern about the recent developments and underscored the “the inadmissibility of a further escalation of the conflict, which poses a threat to the security of the region” (Mfa.ru, July 13).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and many high-ranking officials in Ankara declared strong support to Azerbaijan and condemned Armenia’s aggression. In particular, the foreign ministry statement pointed out that “Armenia’s recent attacks sought to draw the attention of the international community to other places than the illegally occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions [in order] to add new dimensions to the conflict” (Anadolu Agency, July 14).

The co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, the main international mission tasked with coordinating the negotiations between Yerevan and Baku, likewise issued a statement lamenting the breach of the ceasefire and resulting causalities (APA, July 13).

Notably, the Minsk Group is widely criticized in Azerbaijan for its ineffectiveness, having failed to achieve any real breakthrough in the negotiations over the past three decades since it was formed. In one of his most recent media appearances, on July 6, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev openly criticized the international mediators in the negotiations, declaring that the peace process has become “meaningless” (President.az, July 6).

Having been unable to push the Armenian government into substantive negotiations for nearly 30 years, and neglecting the potential repercussions of this extended failure of the peace process, the international mediators had become discredited in the eyes of the Azerbaijani people. In particular, the recent provocation in the town of Shusha, in occupied Karabakh, where the Armenian side held an inauguration ceremony for the so-called new president of the local regime in a place of deep cultural significance to Azerbaijanis, was seen as the last straw for many members of Azerbaijani society. As a result, popular pressure has been growing on the Azerbaijani government to finally liberate the country’s occupied territories at any cost (News.az, May 23).

https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-escalates-with-intense-border-confrontation/

Fuse Lit On August 5, 2019, Detonates On July 12, 2020: Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Flares Up – OpEd

14 July 2020 – 12:01 | By Farid Shafiyev

Clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces in Tovuz, a north-western border region of Azerbaijan, have once again manifested the fragility of the ceasefire between the two conflicting sides. However, this clash, probably the largest for the past two years, is no coincidence, but is the direct result of events that have been unfolding since March 2019.

When the incumbent Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, acceded to power two years ago after the so-called Velvet Revolution, some optimism was voiced about positive dynamics in the conflict negotiation between the two warring parties. Azerbaijan lost the 1992–94 war against Armenia, which resulted in the occupation of internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan.

The roots of the modern conflict go back to February 1988 when, still under the Soviets, Armenian nationalists in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan put forward irredentist claims about the unification (miatsum in Armenian) of the region with Armenia. Later, the Armenian side mostly talked in terms of the right of self-determination for Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Since 1992, the OSCE Minsk Group has been tasked with the conflict resolution process. The Group is currently co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States. In 2009, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs revealed the so-called Madrid Principles for the resolution of the conflict, which stipulated a phased process. Talks had made little progress under the previous Armenian leadership, but the parties were still working on some ideas.

However, in March 2019, Armenia’s leader, Nikol Pashinyan, attempted to change the negotiation format and introduce the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh into the process. The move was rejected by Azerbaijan and the Minsk Group Co-Chairs as contrary to the founding principles of the negotiation laid out in March 1992. The OSCE (CSCE until 1994) documents of March 24 and September 15, 1992, as clarified by the then Chair of the Minsk Group, envisaged the participation of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh if there was progress at the negotiating table.

However, putting the final nail into the coffin of the negotiations, on August 5, 2019, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated during a visit to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan that ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia.’ This was, in effect, a declaration of the annexation of the territory of a neighboring country in violation of four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822,853, 874, and 884). Moreover, it was a return of the 1988 irredentist claim that, for so many years, the Armenian nationalists had tried to avoid.

The revolutionary rhetoric on the domestic front was accompanied by highly jingoistic phraseology at the negotiating table. It is worth recalling that one of Pashinyan’s first moves in his official position was to send his son to serve in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, a gesture that could hardly be seen as one of peace. Armenia’s Defense Minister, David Tonoyan, speaking to the Armenian diaspora in New York on March 30, 2019, a day after a summit of the two countries’ leaders in Vienna, declared a new ‘defense’ concept – ‘new war for new territories.’

The only positive development during 2019 – the reduction of casualties on the line of contact – could not continue without at least some progress in the negotiations.

Nor has the year 2020 so far been conducive to peace. After ministerial-level talks in Geneva in January 2020, it became clear that Armenia does not want to follow the path set out by the Madrid Principles; the Armenian side declared that the Madrid Principles had been a deal made by the previous regime in Yerevan.

The recent highly provocative visit of Prime Minister Pashinyan to the historic Azerbaijani city of Shusha on May 21, 2020, to participate in a so-called inauguration in the aftermath of illegal elections rejected by the international community, showed that no compromise would be reached any time soon. Furthermore, Armenia declared its intention to construct a third highway through the occupied territories of Azerbaijan a – a plan that was condemned by European Parliament members in charge of EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The clashes of July 12–13, which happened in the border region, may have been planned to have wider implications. On July 13, Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan phoned the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) in an attempt to invoke collective action against Azerbaijan.

However, since April 2016, the CSTO has abstained from any involvement in the conflict and it is highly unlikely that the response this time will be different. Many CSTO members cherish strategic relations with Azerbaijan and do not want to follow Armenia’s adventurism, especially during the COVID-19 crisis.

Unfortunately, the window of opportunity for a breakthrough in the negotiations has now closed. How the events will unfold is hard to predict, but peace is no longer on the horizon in the South Caucasus.

https://aircenter.az/en/single/fuse-lit-on-august-5-2019-detonates-on-july-12-2020-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-flares-up–oped-435

Azerbaijani General, 15 Others Killed In Azerbaijan-Armenia Border Clash

July 15, 2020 | By EurAsian Times Desk

Azerbaijani Army Major-General Polad Gashimov and Colonel Ilgar Mirzoyev were killed in border clashes between soldiers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Azerbaijan’s APA news agency reported on Tuesday.

“Major-General Polad Gashimov and colonel Ilgar Mirzoyev died heroically in the morning battles,” the news agency quoted the deputy defense minister as saying. Azerbaijan’s state news agency AzerTAc also confirmed this information.

There are reports that at least 16 people, including the army general, have been killed in fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan forces in the worst border clashes in years. Conflicts on the volatile border between the two neighbours commenced on Sunday and Azerbaijan said it has lost 11 soldiers and one civilian while Armenia acknowledged the loss of four troops.

Azerbaijanis gathered early Wednesday in front of the National Assembly building in the capital demanding that they be mobilized amid clashes with Armenian forces on the frontier.

Thousands of Azerbaijanis marched in the streets of Baku to protest against the occupation of Upper Karabakh by Armenia and attacks by its forces since Sunday on border positions of the Azerbaijani army which have resulted in casualties.

Azerbaijanis living in Baku and surrounding areas formed a cortege in the streets of the city in the evening. Holding Azerbaijani flags and chanting “Karabakh is ours, and will remain ours,” they gathered in front of the country’s parliament building, where they demanded the government to declare a mobilization as they are ready to go to the frontlines and protect their motherland.

On Sunday, Armenian forces, as per their media reports, violated an ongoing ceasefire and targeted positions of Azerbaijan’s army in northwestern Tovuz district along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, resulting in casualties. Azerbaijan’s armed response forced the Armenian army to retreat, suffering losses.

As a result, an Azerbaijani civilian was killed in artillery fire in Aghdam village in Tovuz. “Targeting Azerbaijani civilians with heavy guns is clear proof of fascism and barbarism. This is part of the occupation policy of Armenia.

The Armenian side has purposefully killed Azerbaijani civilians before, thus committing acts of crime against humanity,” Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement. A total of 11 Azerbaijani soldiers have been killed, including high-ranking officers, and another four wounded in fighting with Armenian forces since Sunday.

Nearly 100 Armenian soldiers have been killed during the period, according to Kerim Veliyev, Azerbaijan’s deputy defense minister. Azerbaijan earlier stated that Armenia hides its casualties.

On Tuesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the Armenian attack, adding that Turkey will not hesitate to stand against any kind of attacks against Azerbaijan. Upper Karabakh, or Nagorno-Karabakh, an internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, has been illegally occupied since 1991 through Armenian military aggression.

Four UN Security Council resolutions and two UN General Assembly resolutions as well as decisions by many international organizations refer to this fact and demand the withdrawal of the occupational Armenian forces from Upper Karabakh and seven other occupied regions of Azerbaijan.

A Flare-Up Long Foretold in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

July 15, 2020 | By Farid Shafiyev

Clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces in Tovuz, a northwestern border region of Azerbaijan, have once again manifested the fragility of the ceasefire between the two conflicting sides. However, this clash, probably the largest for the past two years, is no coincidence; rather, it is the direct result of events that have been unfolding since March 2019.

When the incumbent Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, acceded to power two years ago after the so-called Velvet Revolution, some optimism was voiced about positive dynamics in the conflict negotiation between the two warring parties. Azerbaijan lost the 1992–94 war against Armenia, which resulted in the occupation of internationally-recognized territories of Azerbaijan. The roots of the modern conflict go back to February 1988 when, still under Soviet rule, Armenian nationalists in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan put forward irredentist claims about the unification (miatsum in Armenian) of the region with Armenia. Later, the Armenian side mostly talked in terms of the right of self-determination for Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Since 1992, the OSCE Minsk Group has been tasked with the conflict resolution process. The Group is currently co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States. In 2009, the Minsk Group Co-Chairs revealed the so-called Madrid Principles for the resolution of the conflict, which stipulated a phased process. Talks made little progress under the previous Armenian leadership, but the parties were still working through some ideas.

However, in March 2019, Armenia’s leader, Nikol Pashinyan, attempted to change the negotiation format and introduce the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh into the process. The move was rejected by Azerbaijan and the Minsk Group Co-Chairs as contrary to the founding principles of the negotiation laid out in March 1992. The OSCE (CSCE until 1994) documents of March 24 and September 15, 1992, as clarified by the then Chair of the Minsk Group, envisaged the participation of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh if there was progress at the negotiating table.

However, putting the final nail into the coffin of the negotiations, on August 5, 2019, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated during a visit to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia.” This was, in effect, a declaration of the annexation of the territory of a neighboring country in violation of four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884). Moreover, it was a return of the 1988 irredentist claim that, for so many years, the Armenian nationalists had tried to avoid. The revolutionary rhetoric on the domestic front was accompanied by highly jingoistic phraseology at the negotiating table. It is worth recalling that one of Pashinyan’s first moves in his official position was to send his son to serve in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, a gesture that could hardly be seen as one of peace. Armenia’s defense minister, David Tonoyan, speaking to the Armenian diaspora in New York on March 30, 2019 – a day after a summit of the two countries’ leaders in Vienna – declared a new ‘defense’ concept: “new war for new territories.”

The only positive development during 2019 – the reduction of casualties on the line of contact – could not continue without at least some progress in the negotiations.

Nor has the year 2020 so far been conducive to peace. After ministerial-level talks in Geneva in January 2020, it became clear that Armenia does not want to follow the path set out by the Madrid Principles; the Armenian side declared that the Madrid Principles had been a deal made by the previous regime in Yerevan.

The recent highly provocative visit of Prime Minister Pashinyan to the historic Azerbaijani city of Shusha on May 21, 2020, to participate in a so-called inauguration in the aftermath of illegal elections rejected by the international community, showed that no compromise would be reached any time soon. Furthermore, Armenia declared its intention to construct a third highway through the occupied territories of Azerbaijan – a plan that was condemned by European Parliament members in charge of EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The clashes of July 12–13, which happened in the border region, may have been planned to have wider implications. On July 13, Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan phoned the Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) in an attempt to invoke collective action against Azerbaijan. However, since April 2016, the CSTO has abstained from any involvement in the conflict and it is highly unlikely that the response this time will be any different. Many CSTO members cherish strategic relations with Azerbaijan and do not want to follow Armenia’s adventurism, especially during the COVID-19 crisis.

Unfortunately, the window of opportunity for a breakthrough in the negotiations has now closed. How the events will unfold is hard to predict, but peace is no longer on the horizon in the South Caucasus.

Azeri official: EU should distinguish between aggressor and subject of aggression

15 July 2020 | By Georgi Gotev | EURACTIV.com

In an exclusive interview, Hikmat Hajiev, head of the foreign affairs department of Azerbaijan’s presidential administration, explains the stakes of a recent armed clash at the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which he calls a deliberate provocation from Yerevan.

Hikmat Hajiev spoke with EURACTIV’s Senior Editor Georgi Gotev by phone on Tuesday (14 July). 

Regarding the recent tensions at the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, I would like to ask you who started this, given the fact that the European Commission reacted as if both sides carry the responsibility in the same way?

The Armenian side has unleashed this provocation in a deliberate manner. Real facts on the ground speak for themselves. The first, number one fact is that before the clashes, we have monitored a concentration of Armenian troops and high-level military officials around this area. Secondly, the Armenian side says that there was one small military car, truck or minibus that engaged, but it’s ridiculous. No one conducts any attack or operation offensive with a small, unarmored car. The real fact is that the Armenian side attacked the positions of the Azerbaijani side with artillery. It was sudden and targeted deliberate attack. In order to diffuse tension in the border area, Azerbaijan deployed State Border Service personnel along the border with Armenia. If Azerbaijan had launched this operation, Azerbaijan would have launched it in the occupied territories to ensure their liberation.

They started with an artillery attack on 12 July.  It is military aggression. It is an illegal use of force and it is also a military provocation.

Also, as a result of the attack, our soldiers have been killed and in the initial phase, there were no casualties from Armenia’s side. It also once again demonstrates the fact that the attacking side was Armenia. Why has Armenia done such an attack? Because they want to create a new source of tension in the region and a new source of conflict in the region, particularly in the border area of two countries. And we also see the Armenian side tries to derail the negotiations process by all means, to not liberate Azerbaijani territories. Once they feel the pressure, they try to create a new military provocation, so to evade their responsibility. Third, we also see a declining social-economic situation in Armenia. The situation is becoming worse, particularly in the list of spreading of COVID. The Armenian government is trying to deflect public attention and anger. They are also seeking yet another purpose, maybe to involve the political-military organisation of which they are member, to this conflict. This is yet another risky and dirty game of the Armenian side.  Even in this institution, no country believes Armenia and they also understand that it is hypocrisy.

To better understand the situation, it probably should be reminded that this time this is not a clash on the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces along the occupied territory of Nagorno Karabakh – it’s a clash on the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Is this correct?

Yes, you’re absolutely right. We are now not talking about the line of contact. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the line of contact is an area that Armenia occupied in Nagorno Karabakh and seven regions of Azerbaijan. But the border area of Armenia and Azerbaijan is completely different. That is yet another positive intention from the Azerbaijani side, that we deployed the state border service of Azerbaijan since 2018 to somehow demilitarize, in general, the concept of the border between the two countries on a step-by-step basis. And for the most parts of the border of Azerbaijan in the Western dimension, Tovuz and Gasakh regions of Azerbaijan are now taken by the state border service of Azerbaijan.

But on the Armenian side, on the contrary, will see further militarization of the border of two countries and deployment of heavy armaments and artillery. They attacked Azerbaijan’s positions with the use of artillery as a sudden attack. Four servicemen of the Azerbaijani armed forces have been killed and five others have been wounded. And since yesterday evening, there was an intensive shooting and there are casualties from our side as well. Unfortunately, such irresponsible actions of Armenia are not only limited to this incident, targeting the military.

Attacking civilian objects and civilians is the modus operandi and the rule of engagement of Armenian armed forces. In the border area and also in the line of contact they regularly attack Azerbaijani civilians. When they are seeing their weaknesses in the battleground and fail in diplomacy they resort to attacking civilians. Along the border, Aghdam and Gushchu villages of Azerbaijan since yesterday have been heavily bombarded by the artillery of Armenia. Today, we regret that one 76-year-old man was killed as a result of an Armenian artillery attack. And some other civilian objects suffered damages as well. It once again demonstrates that Armenia is flagrantly violating international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions.

Do you think there is a strategy to involve Russia under the military agreement Armenia has with Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)? Do you think that under this agreement, in the case of conflict, Russia is obliged to provide military assistance to its ally Armenia?

Actually, we took note of the statement from the ministry of foreign affairs of Russia that said that there should be a demonstration of restraint and also there is a statement by OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that also calls for negotiations and restraint. Maybe it’s one of the bad intentions of Armenia to involve other institutions or organizations of which they are a member in their conflict process. But we remain assured that all countries understand the situation very well and hiding ill intentions of Armenia.

Armenia by committing this border provocation tries to evade responsibility for the occupation of Azerbaijani territories – Nagorno Karabakh and seven adjacent regions. Azerbaijan has good neighbourly relations and strategic partnership with Russia. What Armenia is doing now on the border area is a continuation of the policy of military aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan. The whole international community is fighting against COVID. Under these circumstances, the United Nations Secretary-General also made an appeal to all countries about a global ceasefire initiative. Armenia, by saying that they support this initiative and then flagrantly violating the ceasefire regime, attacking Azerbaijani positions with heavy artillery, demonstrates their true face. It is hypocrisy and nothing else. And we also see the further spread of coronavirus as a result of inactions or disabilities of the Armenian government. Therefore, under such circumstances, to evade attention from the socio-economic difficulties under the policy of Azerbaijani phobia, they would like to direct public anger and public dismay to the conflict.

If the strategy of Armenia is to involve their Russian ally, it should be reminded that your country, Azerbaijan has excellent relations with Russia, and overall, Azerbaijan’s policy is to have good relations with all major players. Do you think that there is any risk that Russia will play Yerevan’s game?

Azerbaijan and Russia have a strategic partnership relationship, and we have open channels of dialogue in all spheres. Russia is an OSCE Minsk Group co-chair country and strives for the resolution of the conflict. And since the start of this outbreak in the border area, we have seen the diplomatic engagement of the Russian side, along with some other countries for the diffusion of the situation. But this is the hypocrisy of Armenia, they have such bad intentions to involve to political-military institutions of which they are member in the conflict. That’s probably one of the reasons that Armenia decided to launch overt provocation against Azerbaijani armed forces. The OSCE Minsk Group is the only mandated institution to deal with the resolution of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The UN Security Council resolutions and Helsinki Final Act constitute their mandate.

Do you think the European Union understands the situation?

I think the EU and EU countries have a better understanding of the situation. From our side, we are also trying to inform our EU partners. The EU also made a statement on this recent escalation. The Commissioner on foreign and security policy talked to our foreign minister. But we expect more addressed statements from EU to distinguish between the aggressor and those who have been the subject of aggression. The actions of Armenia need to be strongly condemned by the international community and EU as well. The impunity of Armenia encourages Yerevan to new military adventures and provocations.  We also expect that the EU should assess the illegal activities of Armenia in the occupied territories, including the illegal settlement of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

Will Armenia and Azerbaijan go to war again?

By Inside Story | 16 Jul 2020

Border skirmishes near the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region have killed at least 16.

Former Soviet republics Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region for decades.

The area is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but controlled by ethnic Armenian forces.

Since a 1994 ceasefire, there have been regular battles near the border.

Both countries accuse each other of triggering the latest artillery bombardment and drone attacks north of the disputed region.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has sacked the foreign minister, accusing him of “meaningless negotiations” with Armenia.

Can the two sides resolve decades of animosity?

Presenter: Imran Khan

Guests:

Hikmet Hajiyev – Assistant to the Azerbaijan president

Arsen Kharatyan – Former adviser to the Armenia prime minister

Ibrahim Fraihat – Associate professor of conflict resolution at Doha Institute

https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2020/7/16/will-armenia-and-azerbaijan-go-to-war-again

New Fighting Brings Three-year Armenian-Azerbaijani Truce to an End

16 July 2020 | By Laurence Broers

Deadly clashes at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan have followed renewed disappointment in the peace process, and cast a new shadow over its future.

Although the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is focused on the Line of Contact around Nagorny Karabakh, a new – and significant – outbreak of violence has happened some 300 kilometres away on high ground along the de jure Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

Although not a first, violence in this area has generally been contained by the proximity of major transport and infrastructure arteries, and of civilian populations on both sides of the border. Plus, unlike in Nagorny Karabakh, the extended deterrents conferred by Armenia’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and bilateral agreements with Russia are also – theoretically at least – in force.

Despite this, battlespaces opened rapidly, with bombardment of civilian homes, drone strikes and cyberattacks on government and other sites being widely reported by both sides. At the time of writing, combined reported casualties were already at least 16, the highest for a single incident since April 2016’s ‘four-day war’.

Most are known to be Azerbaijani combatants, including the highest-ranking Azerbaijani serviceman to be killed in action since the 1990s – the respected Major General Polad Hashimov. And, although rumoured to be removed soon anyway following a campaign of negative briefing, Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov was publicly blamed in the immediate aftermath for ‘meaningless’ diplomacy and dismissed. He was replaced by education minister Jeyhun Bayramov.

Origins of the clashes

How the fighting began remains unclear. The escalation did not appear to result from a coordinated offensive operation of the kind that led to the four-day war, nor are there obvious strategic goals for either side in terms of the international border. There does appear to have been an element of surprise as an Azerbaijani vehicle unexpectedly encountered a new Armenian post, triggering deadly artillery exchanges.

Unclear boundaries in highland terrain may have played a role. Although referred to as the international border, the de jure boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan – previously an inconsequential internal administrative boundary in the Soviet Union – is not clearly demarcated in many areas and does not coincide with lines of actual control.

Here, as in Nakhichevan – Azerbaijan’s exclave bordering Armenia and Iran – Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have been engaged in long-term, incremental competition for tactical advantage by claiming higher ground in ‘no man’s lands’. But in remote and cartographically ambiguous areas, the precise location of borders – and even place-names – are unclear, and rival forces can unexpectedly meet their adversaries.

Although clear strategic objectives appear absent, what might then have been a lesser incident escalated purposefully into a crisis – suggesting a political rationale.

A missed opportunity for a negotiations reset

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan began 2020 with unfinished consolidations of domestic power – whether bottom-up in the case of Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’, or top-down in the case of Azerbaijan elite renewal. COVID-19 then added further challenges, with the government of Armenia facing significant domestic criticism for its handling of the pandemic, while numerous opposition activists in Azerbaijan were arrested, and the country’s economic vulnerability to external shocks was highlighted.

But throughout this, the frontlines did remain calm – as they generally have since the three-year period from 2014-2017 which witnessed regular skirmishes, use of heavy weaponry and four days of intensive combat in April 2016. In January 2019, the OSCE Minsk Group made the often-cited announcement that the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on the necessity of ‘preparing their populations for peace’.

Although the quietest year on the frontline since the 1990s then followed, neither side invested seriously in a peace strategy. After a reasonable start and moves towards humanitarian cooperation, relations between President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually visibly soured.

Several moves, such as the go-ahead for new infrastructure in the occupied territories and Pashinyan’s attendance at de facto leader Arayik Harutyunyan’s inauguration in Nagorny Karabakh, were received in Azerbaijan as evidence of Armenian insincerity towards the peace process.

More inflammatory rhetoric then resumed, leading the OSCE Minsk Group to call for calm at the end of June. As recently as July 7, President Aliyev expressed public criticism of the peace process and emphasised the validity of Azerbaijan’s right to use force.

Each new round of Armenian-Azerbaijani fighting serves as an audit of the various restraining factors preventing a larger war. A Russian-Euro-Atlantic-Iranian consensus on proactively containing any new Armenian-Azerbaijani war appears to still hold, although senior-level attention from US secretary of state Mike Pompeo trailed that of his counterparts.

Russia acted quickly to offer mediation, reflecting the reality that any large-scale Armenia-Azerbaijan war would test Russia’s extended deterrence guarantees to Armenia. As in April 2016, Turkey has been vigorous in its support of Azerbaijan, raising concerns in Armenia and drawing oblique warnings from Russia. On the other hand, the CSTO – much to Armenian chagrin – dithered, initially calling then postponing a meeting citing the need for more time to study the situation.

Unprecedented spontaneous demonstrations in Baku called for war with Armenia, broke into the Azerbaijani parliament and, in some cases, articulated anti-government slogans. In the absence of reliable polling, such protests cannot be taken as evidence of a popular consensus in favour of war.

But they do underline the importance of the conflict as the one issue in Azerbaijan where open protest is accepted as legitimate and cannot easily be dispersed. As losses over the past week are counted, the dismissal of the foreign minister may not be sufficient to quell public anger.

Prospects are now real of a return to the dynamics in 2014-15: recursive low-level violence aimed at influencing the diplomatic calendar and public opinion while remaining below the deterrence threshold for triggering active external involvement.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/new-fighting-brings-three-year-armenian-azerbaijani-truce-end

The latest Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes are no coincidence

16 July 2020 | By Cavid Veliyev

The fact that the clashes are taking place at an internationally recognised border holds points towards the motives behind Armenia’s aggression.

The 26-year ceasefire agreement on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has not ensured peace, and a new clash has emerged. This time, the clash is on the Azerbaijan-Armenia state border, not in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding districts). 

The clashes, in their third day now, in the Tavush district at the Azerbaijan-Armenia state border have resulted in the deaths of military personnel on both sides. 

According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense, Armenia’s armed forces suddenly attacked their military positions in Tavush with mortars and howitzers. In response, the Azerbaijani army retaliated by destroying important military facilities in Armenia on the border using Turkish-made TB2 drones. 

What’s intriguing is that the latest clash is different to the one that took place in April 2016 at the line of contact in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Today we are seeing a different breed of conflict taking place on the accepted state border which has the potential to descend into a wider conflict.

In recent years, even if there was no active armed conflict between the two parties, there was constant diplomatic arm wrestling. 

The main reason for this tension has been the failure of diplomatic negotiations in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair. There was significant progress in negotiations between the two sides in 2019 which included a mutual visit of journalists, the establishing of a direct communication line between the two states and people to people initiatives. 

However, Armenia’s refusal to withdraw its military forces from the internationally recognised territories of Azerbaijan and its efforts to change the format of diplomatic negotiations caused a deep mistrust in negotiations. Armenia is satisfied with the stalled negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group as this allows Armenia to continue with the status-quo. 

The last video conference held between Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s Foreign Ministers Elmar Mammadyarov and Zohrab Mnatsakanyan respectively was to discuss the public health situation in the region, current dynamics in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the next steps for  a resolution. 

After the meeting, Minsk Group co-chairs made a boilerplate statement about the general principles of negotiation process. However, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev stated that the negotiations were meaningless and that the OSCE Minsk Group should put pressure on Armenia to end its occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories. 

On the other hand, the Azerbaijani army has lowered morale within the Armenian army through its military gains. Several significant strategic heights have been taken back by the Azerbaijani Army in several directions from the frontline in recent years (notably in April 2016). 

Armenia’s current prime minister Niko Pashinyan vowed to create a new atmosphere in the military as well as in the political arena. Seemingly, in order to achieve this, a new attack was needed. Armenia’s new Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan, who previously said “new territories in the event of a new war” during previous clashes, threatened Azerbaijan with the invasion of “new advantageous positions” in a newer statement. 

Armenia thought that this time it would receive support from its allies unlike the 2016 April war. This would also boost the new government’s reputation among the public. With the current clashes Armenia is attempting to draw in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) into the South Caucasus region. 

The statements voiced from Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs also play to this point. Right after the incident, the Armenian foreign minister made a phone call to the CSTO’s Secretary General, after which the alliance decided to hold an extraordinary meeting on 13 July, but then postponed it to an unspecified date. 

Later on, the CSTO Secretary General made a statement and invited the parties to remain calm. That is to say, Armenia could not receive the support it expected from its allies, again. This is in part due to the fact that Azerbaijan has improved relations with CSTO members states – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. 

Notably, Belarus sold the Polonez missile systems to Azerbaijan to counter Armenia’s Iskander missile system sold by Russia. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Turkic Council together with Azerbaijan, and the Turkic Council undertook the decision in all seven summits that the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be resolved within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. 

In addition, Turkey (Azerbaijan’s key ally), Pakistan and Ukraine made statements supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The statement from Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the Armenian attacks. Turkey says that Armenia is using the event as an attempt to distract the international community’s attention from Armenia’s continued illegal occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories. 

Some Turkish experts believe that there is a link between the Libya operations, the recent Hagia Sophia decision and the conflict at the Armenia- Azerbaijan border. Furthermore, Tavush is a geographical connection point in the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey triangle. This region is not far from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and Southern Gas Corridor. 

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported Azerbaijan and said that the attack is beyond Armenia’s capacity, which means someone must have encouraged Armenia to attack Azerbaijan.

https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-latest-armenia-azerbaijan-clashes-are-no-coincidence-38166

New Hotspot in the Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan

July 16, 2020 | By Naghi Ahmadov

According to Azerbaijani military sources, starting from noon on July 12, 2020, the Armenian armed forces attempted to attack in order to capture positions in the direction of the Tovuz region of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border during the time when all the nations are busy with the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, the Armenian armed forces violated the ceasefire and used artillery against a stronghold in Tovuz district to shell civilian settlements, however, the attack of the Armenian armed forces was being successfully prevented by retaliatory measures of the Azerbaijani army. As a result of counter-measures, the Armenian military units suffered heavy losses. The spread videos confirm the response of the Azerbaijani Army to the Armenian incursion into the Tovuz region. While the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan revealed the number of casualties – 11 servicemen, the Armenian side first denied their losses and then reported about 4 casualties.

Yerevan, in its turn, have accused Baku for an attempt to escalate the long-standing conflict. The Armenian Ministry of Defense stated in response that the Azerbaijani side was the first to use the artillery in order to capture a strategic point by shelling their positions. Armenian MoD claims that a group of Azerbaijani soldiers tried to cross the Armenian border with an UAZ automobile and went back to their positions after Armenian side’s warning,leaving the car behind.But Azerbaijani officials argued, “If the Azerbaijani side wanted to cross the Armenian border, which in an undeclared state of war, it would have carried out the attack not with cars, but in armored vehicles.”

On July 10, 2020, the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia hold a meeting in Yerevan, chaired by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. During the meeting Armenia’s National Security Strategy was approved in addition to discussing other security-related issues. As the attack of the Armenian armed forces in the direction of Tovuz district on the state border between Azerbaijan and Armenia happened two days after this meeting, there might be a possible link between these two events. Another fact that should not be overlooked is the visit of Feliks Tsolakyan, Armenian Minister of Emergency Situations to Tavush region on the border with Azerbaijan on July 11. According to official information, Tsolakyan got acquainted with the regional branch of the ministry, held meetings and gave instructions. It is worth recalling that Davit Tonoyan was the Minister of Emergency Situations before appointed Minister of Defence.

Two countries have been living in a state of war for 30 years due to unresolved territorial problems around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, however, after the war of 1992-94, heavy artillery rarely entered into their dispute. The last time large-scale hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan were recorded in April 2016 and called the “four-day war”.

Since 1992 the conflict is being mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States. Unfortunately, there is no progress achieved at the negotiation table though the Minsk Group Co-Chairs revealed the Madrid Principles in 2009, which was the subject of discussion between the two parties of the conflict. The recent development manifested that Yerevan decided to abandon the Madrid Principles and opted for solidifying the result of military occupation. “The provocation by Armenia, perpetrated along the border, is yet another evidence that the official Yerevan is disinterested in the negotiated settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.”said by Hikmat Hajiyev, Assistant of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani side called the international community to condemn Armenia’s policy of aggression against Azerbaijan and hold Armenia accountable for its provocations on the border.

There are hot debates on the reasons of the escalation and who started the fire first on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. First, after the negotiations reached impasse, the rising of tension was inescapable. In May, Armenian Prime-Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited historic Azerbaijani city of Shusha in the occupied territories, provoking strong sentiments in Azerbaijan. Secondly, some experts argue that provoking conflicts will distract people’s attention from severe economic problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this sense, situation in Armenia is worse than in Azerbaijan.

As for the question of who started the fire first, if Azerbaijan attacked first, logicallyit had to choose any direction from the positions on the line of contact, which under international law gives full authority to do so.However, the incident at the inter-state border gave Yerevan an opportunity to call for the protection from a CSTO military alliance (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). Despite an initial plan to convene the emergency meeting, the CSTO then cancelled the meeting, issuing only a statement to both parties to refrain from the use of force.

Some other experts argue about the importance of energy and transport infrastructure that Armenia might target in Azerbaijan near Tovuz region. The successful implementation by Baku several energy projects with Georgia, Turkey and the EU happened against the background of the increasingly isolated status of Yerevan. However, this scenario undoubtedly will lead to the large scale confrontation between the two states.

It is clear that the main underlying reason of the current border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the unresolved conflict. Perpetuating the status-quo in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is no longer an option.

What is Next for Armenia – Azerbaijan Conflict?

16 July 2020 | By Vasif Huseynov

The recent escalation (July 12-14) along the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan poses questions for many local and international observers about the future of the more than thirty-years old conflict between the two countries: How will the conflict evolve from this point? Is a full-scale war possible? How will the clashes affect the future of the peace process? While it is impossible to predict the near future of the process at this particular time, some conclusions from the recent events can be tentatively drawn.

Above all, the intense clashes between the two sides resulting in death of in total more than 15 military servicemen and a civilian demonstrated that the peaceful initiatives made in the aftermath of Armenia’s governmental change in 2018 had delivered no lasting positive outcome. As a matter of fact, there had been some important developments over the last two years. Although the two conflicting parties failed to reach a tangible breakthrough in negotiations, they took necessary measures to prevent their diplomatic failure from reflecting on the line of contact.

Direct leadership contacts and communication channels between security personnel and political representatives, agreed between Azerbaijan’s President and Armenia’s Prime Minister in Dushanbe in October 2018, helped minimize clashes and casualties in 2019. Statistics provided by the International Crisis Group show a significant decrease in the number of casualties last year compared to previous years. For example, while 39 military servicemen were killed in 2017, the year before Armenia’s power change in 2018, casualties dropped to 8, including one civilian, in 2019.

Moreover, agreements on the establishment of humanitarian projects and allowing support visits by relatives of detainees held in each other’s territories, as well as of journalists, have helped reduce tensions. In November, the two countries performed the first exchange of journalists since 2001. Three journalists from each side joined the initiative and met with the expert community and media representatives from the other side. Importantly, Azerbaijani journalists were also allowed to visit the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where they met the local Armenian community.

The provocation by the Armenian side on the state border on July 12 with apparent intention to push for a joint action by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has likely put an end to these peaceful initiatives, at least for the near future.  The intense level of confrontation between the warring countries demonstrates the two are not likely to return to the agenda of preparing populations for peace anytime soon, as the AIR Center’s Chairman Farid Shafiyev recently stated, “the window of opportunity for a breakthrough in the negotiations has now closed”, adding that “peace is no longer on the horizon in the South Caucasus.”

Another implication of the recent clashes can be expected for the international mediation of the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Important to note that, the Azerbaijani side has declared its dissatisfaction with the international mediation since a few years. But most importantly, in one of his most recent media appearances, on July 6, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev openly criticized the international mediators in the negotiations, declaring that the peace process has become “meaningless”.

In a strong worded statement regarding the Armenia’s destructive attitude to the negotiations, President Aliyev stated that “Today, the negotiation process is not moving. Video conferences of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan are meaningless. It simply is meant to show that the Minsk Group [the institution of the OSCE tasked with the coordination of negotiations between the two sides] is active. But is it? To be active means to act.”

It can be expected that in the upcoming months there will be some moves by the international mediators to revitalize the peace process and achieve a breakthrough, at least at a limited scale. Importantly, some initiatives in this direction had been already observed over the last few months from the Russian government that is a major mediator in the negotiations being also a Co-Chair of the OSCE’s Minsk Group along with France and the United States. For example, during a videoconference organized by the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared Russia’s support to “firmly established format” of negotiations underscoring the significance of the draft documents on the agenda as a “very important step in implementing the [United Nations] Security Council resolutions”.

Hopefully, the mediating parties have noted the urgency of a breakthrough after the recent clashes which runs risk of spiraling out of control all of a sudden. However, is a full-scale war possible under the existing circumstances? While it is reported that the tensions have already eased between the sides on the border, an all-out war cannot be excluded. The tensions are rather strained in the region and the citizens are outraged by the loss of military servicemen and civilians in the course of the recent clashes. Importantly, the popular indignation is more dramatic in Azerbaijan provoked also by the recent political moves in the town of Shusha, in occupied Karabakh, where the Armenian side held an inauguration ceremony for the so-called new president of the local regime in a place of deep cultural significance to Azerbaijanis.

The possibility of an all-out war has not been ruled out by Polad Bulbuloglu, Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation, either. Declaring that it is more important to ask why the recent clashes happened than wondering who started them, Bulbuloglu asserts that this all happens “[b]ecause the territories of Azerbaijan are occupied. Because foreign troops forcefully keep the territory of Azerbaijan. I am not shy and say that it is time to resolve this conflict on the basis of international law, and international law is completely on the Azerbaijani side”  

https://aircenter.az/en/single/what-is-next-for-armenia–azerbaijan-conflict-437

Cultural Cradle of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Region Faces Persistent Provocations

18 August 2020 | By Dr. Vasif Huseynov

Twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s territories fell under the control of neighboring Armenia as a result of the 1988-1994 war the latter launched against Azerbaijan. The occupied territories include the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts which have been recognized by all the states and international organizations as belonging to Azerbaijan. Every inch of these territories is considered sacred by most Azerbaijanis who vow to liberate them at any rate soon or later. It is therefore only for the analytical purpose of this article that the importance of one part of the occupied region, the Shusha city, is exclusively underscored.

Shusha was originally established in 1752 by Panah Ali Khan, the first ruler of the Karabakh khanate, as a fortress to stave off the attacks by his rivals. This particular location was chosen due to the area’s geographic location at the 1300-1600 m. altitude surrounded by stiff cliffs which made it inaccessible for enemy attacks. Previously known as Panahabad after Panah Ali Khan, the city reportedly gained its modern name following the attacks of Mohammad Shah of the Persian Empire during the rule of Panah Ali Khan’s son, Ibrahim Khan.

Legend says that the Shah wrote a letter in verse to Ibrahim Khan, saying: “Look, God is ‘pouring stones’ on your head from heaven. How can you sit in that ‘glass fortress?’” What he meant was: “We’re going to raze your city to the ground, as though it were made of glass.” Ibrahim Khan’s self-confident answer was: “I know that God will protect me even in this ‘glass.’” The city succeeded to rebuff Shah’s siege thanks to its geography in addition to the dedicated mobilization of the residents. After that, the city came to be known as “Shusha,” which means “glass” in Azerbaijani.

The city marked an impressive progress in the following decades, particularly in sphere of culture. Often called the “Conservatory of the Caucasus”, the city gave birth to many famous artists, musicians and poets. For example, Uzeyir Hajibeyov, the founder of Azerbaijan’s composed classical music and opera, and the first composer of an opera in the Islamic world, was born and grew up in Shusha.  The city was the birthplace of Azerbaijan’s famous tenor Bulbul, a 19th century Azerbaijani poetess Khurshid Banu Natavan. Molla Panah Vagif, Azerbaijan’s 18th century poet who founded the realistic trend in Azerbaijani poetry was born and lived in Shusha for his entire life. The city’s contributions to Azerbaijan’s culture flourished in the 20th century with the birth of renowned conductor Niyazi and famous singers Seyid and Khan Shushinski.

Throughout its history the city was predominantly settled by Azerbaijanis and, in 1989, was home to 20,579 people whose 1,377 were ethnic Armenians. In the course of the full-scale war Armenia waged against Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, the city fell under former’s control on May 8, 1992. As a result of the occupation of Shusha, 480 civilians were killed, 600 wounded, 22,000 displaced. Nothing is known about the fate of 68 who were taken hostage by the Armenians.

The occupation put an end to the rise of the Shusha city and made it subject to relentless cultural genocide, as Armenians, in an attempt to erase the imprints of Azerbaijanis, destroyed or misappropriated the cultural icons of the city. According to the official reports, 279 religious, historical and cultural monuments have been destroyed, including Khan cave, Gakhal cave and the Shusha castle.

One of the most recent of such acts against the cultural monuments of Azerbaijanis in Shusha occurred recently vis-à-vis the Yukhari Govkhar aga mosque, founded by Govkhar aga, Panakh Ali Khan’s daughter in 1883-84. Under the guise of “restoration”, Armenians sought to change the historical and cultural significance of the monument and presented it as “a center of Persian culture”. Azerbaijanis were particularly outraged by the involvement of the Iranian companies in this process which they characterized as a blatant violation of the interstate agreements between Azerbaijan and Iran.

Familiar with the exclusive moral importance of the Shusha city for Azerbaijanis, Armenians make consistent provocative moves, including of political nature, concerning the city. At least twice over the last few months, the city was subject to such provocations.

First, on May 21, an “inauguration ceremony” was held in Shusha for the “newly-elected” leader of the occupational regime Armenia established in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijani MP, Chairman of the Azerbaijani community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, Tural Ganjaliyev, stated that “This provocation with the participation of the Armenian political leadership was arranged in the building of “Azerbaijan” cinema in the occupied Azerbaijani city of Shusha”, adding that this served only one purpose – to disrupt the peace negotiations.

In the early August, few weeks after the clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the state border between the two countries, Armenians, taking the advantage of the moral value of Shusha for Azerbaijanis, made another provocative move. The head of the separatist regime of Nagorno-Karabakh announced his intention to move the “capital” of the region and local “state structures” to Shusha from Khankandi. Reacting to this, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan declared that “Armenia must stop testing the patience of the international community, and first of all the Azerbaijani state and society, by its illegal actions and provocative statements.”

Truly, against the backdrop of the admitted failure of the peace talks in the existing format and the alarming level of escalation of the conflict in July, the persistence of such provocations signifies further intensification of the conflict in the near future. Russia’s apparent drifting away from neutrality by arming Armenia amidst its attacks against Azerbaijan and new dynamics in the geopolitical map of the region indicate that a new military escalation might not remain limited to isolated clashes. This is, therefore, extremely important for the international community, including the United Nations and the OSCE, to pay due attention to the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict and make a tangible contribution for the restoration of peace in the region.

https://aircenter.az/en/single/cultural-cradle-of-azerbaijans-karabakh-region-faces-persistent-provocations-448

Did coronavirus cause the most recent Azerbaijan-Armenia escalation?

“The situation internally in Armenia is so bad with coronavirus, its leaders want to deviate the attention of the masses,” said Leyla Abdullayeva.

By MAAYAN JAFFE-HOFFMAN  | JULY 18, 2020 16:20

COVID-19 may have been the catalyst behind the recent military escalation on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border in the Tovuz region, some analysts believe.

The short and deadly series of attacks served as a distraction from the novel virus, which has ravaged both countries’ economies and rocked their already precarious political situations.

“The situation internally in Armenia is so bad with coronavirus, its leaders want to deviate the attention of the masses,” said Leyla Abdullayeva, head of the Press Service Department of the Azerbaijan Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Similarly, Tevan Poghosyan, president of the International Center for Human Development, an Armenian think tank, told The Jerusalem Post that “Azerbaijan’s internal situation, its economic collapse and that it got hit hard by coronavirus” likely led to recent attacks.

He said that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev must have considered “if they would start a conflict, it would deflect from internal issues and make coronavirus look like a small drop in comparison to the conflict.”

According to the Azerbaijani narrative, on July 12, the Armenian army attempted to attack Azerbaijani positions with artillery fire in the direction of the northwestern Tovuz border district, withdrawing after suffering losses following retaliation from the Azerbaijani military.

The attack violated international law and the existing cease-fire agreement between the two countries, Elin Suleymanov, Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to the United States, told the Post.

According to the Armenian narrative, Azerbaijani soldiers drove a military combat vehicle toward the border. Armenian soldiers issued warnings, after which the Azerbaijani soldiers abandoned the vehicle and retreated. Shortly after, the Azerbaijani troops launched an attack and attempted to capture the Armenian military position by using artillery fire and Armenia retaliated.

Anna Naghdalyan, the Armenia Foreign Ministry spokesperson, said the attack was an attempt by Azerbaijan to “impose its will” on the country and “show its military advantage over Armenia.”

The escalation has resulted in bloodshed on both sides, including the death of a 76-year-old Azeri civilian who was killed by mortar fire.

The latest clashes were considered unusual, even though the two former Soviet republics have been in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh since 1994, because they occurred in the Tovuz region, roughly 300 kilometers from contested Nagorno-Karabakh.

Moreover, the attacks occurred close to the region’s oil and gas pipelines, including the Southern Gas Corridor, which provides vital energy security for Europe, raising concerns among the international community.

Some analysts said that Armenia was attempting to expand the scope of the confrontation and to involve external actors such as its Collective Security Treatment Organization allies, which is why it chose the Tovuz region.

Armenia is considered to be occupying Nagorno-Karabakh since 1991, in violation of four UN Security Council resolutions and against US State Department policy, which does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country and “supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.”

Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire agreement in May 1994, but it has never been fully observed and from time to time fire erupts.

However, the theory that COVID-19 sparked the outburst is seen as equally likely.

So far, according to Worldometer’s coronavirus tracking system, Armenia has suffered 34,001 cases of corona and 620 deaths.

The country has been operating in a state of emergency since the peak of the first outbreak. The capacities of its hospitals are exhausted. The pandemic, like in most parts of the world, led to income loss, layoffs and lockdowns and many citizens face serious financial problems.

Critics have accused the Armenian government and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of handling the crisis ineffectively, which analysts believe could turn into a political crisis.

“The Pashinyan administration had to face several serious challenges at the same time,” Azerbaijani-Israeli analyst Arye Gut told the Post. “The economic crisis in the country because of COVID-19 and internal political intrigues intensified, as did pressure from the opposition and opponents of Pashinyan himself. In this case, the only way out of the impasse could be a small war with Azerbaijan to distract attention of its people from the serious socio-economic problems within the country caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

“The coronavirus has led Armenia to disaster, and the country is in a terrifying epidemic situation,” he concluded.

At the same time, according to Worldometer’s coronavirus tracking system, some 26,165 Azeris have been infected with coronavirus and 334 have died. The World Health Organization reported that Azerbaijan was among the top countries in Europe whose health care system was at risk of collapse from overburden due to the pandemic. The country’s authorities have expressed concern over its ability to handle the continual crisis, raising fears of a shortage of doctors.

Last month, during a visit to a hospital in the city of Ganja, it was reported that President Ilham Aliyev warned the public that “everyone must know that doctors also get infected, and doctors also die.”

He said “we have gotten all available doctors involved in this work. We do not have double this number of doctors. If this pandemic spreads even more – let’s say, if we have 300-400 infected people today and their number increases tomorrow, where shall we place them? Even if we do place them – hospitals are being built and we have empty beds – how can we increase the number of doctors?”

Vagif Dargahli, a spokesperson for Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry, told the Post that the border has been quiet but tense since the recent outbreak and said that Azerbaijan is not preparing for war.

“We want to be at peace,” he claimed.

Nagdalyan expressed similar sentiments: “There is no alternative to the peaceful resolution to the conflict.”

https://www.jpost.com/international/did-coronavirus-cause-the-most-recent-azerbaijan-armenia-escalation-635412

‘Velvet Populism’ Ends Decade-Long Discussion Of The Madrid Principles – OpEd

18 September 2020 | By Dr.Esmira Jafarova

Recently, those observing the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict witnessed another brick falling from the already shattered peace process. At the end of August, Anna Hakobyan, the wife of the Prime Minster of the Republic Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, participated in publicized military training in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan; her targets, picturing Azerbaijani subjects, went viral on social media. This happened only one year after her famous call for peace that saw her pictured with a bouquet of flowers in hand.

Reactions on the Azerbaijani side were rightly both confused and irritated – but also, somehow, acquiescent. Unfortunately, the July 12–14 clashes at the international border in the direction of Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, as well as the events preceding them and ensuing after this escalation, do not leave much room for optimism that the incumbent Armenian leadership will in any way commit to meaningful peace negotiations from now on.

In reality, the military posture of Pashinyan’s wife, as a gesture, is nothing new. In 2018, Pashinyan and his wife sent their son to serve in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The chain of purposeful provocations in regard to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, instrumentalized by Armenia’s so-called ‘revolutionary’ leadership that ascended to power in mid-2018, have already dealt a serious blow to the peace negotiations.

The list of provocations and disruptive actions further include Nikol Pashinyan’s infamous ‘Karabakh is Armenia and period’ statement that was also coupled with the rejuvenation of a dangerous miatsum (unification) ideology in regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan; the organization of the so-called ‘parliamentary and presidential elections’ in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan; and Pashinyan’s visit to the historical Azerbaijani city of Shusha in May 2020.

However, the real step towards halting the negotiations was taken in March 2020, when the Armenia rejected the existence of any document at the negotiation table, despite both sides, under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by France, Russia and the U.S.A., working on the so-called Madrid Principles for the resolution of the conflict. Those Principles were first revealed in 2007 and revised in 2009.

Armenian Defense Minister David Tonoyan’s vow in early 2019 to wage ‘new wars for new territories,’ alongside Prime Minister Pashinyan’s attempts to revive the debate around the principles and clauses enshrined in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which was never ratified but encompasses Yerevan’s territorial claims towards Turkey, also became vivid testimonies to the lack of interest on the Armenian side for engaging in a meaningful conflict resolution process.

On the 100th anniversary of the signing of the treaty, at the Treaty of Sevres and the Armenian Question forum held by Armenian scholars at the National Academy of Sciences in Yerevan, Pashinyan specifically stated that ‘… the Treaty of Sevres is a historical fact and it remains such up to this day… historic justice was being restored, and favorable conditions were being created for the restoration of the economic and demographic potential of the Armenian people. Although the Treaty of Sevres was not fulfilled, it continues existing as a historic fact, our duty is to remember it, realize and preserve its meaning… .’

In early August 2020, Armenian nationalists also issued a declaration calling it a ‘document of powerful geopolitical importance,’ thereby laying territorial claims to both Turkey and Azerbaijan in pursuit of the ‘Great Armenia’ project.

Thus, the optimism once voiced on the part of Azerbaijani officials that this new leadership in Armenia could potentially replicate their much-touted ‘revolution’ in peace talks with Azerbaijan, engage in peace negotiations in good faith, and aim at working to attain restorative justice in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, unfortunately turned out to be short-lived.

It now becomes exceedingly clear that where we stand today in terms of peace negotiations depends on where Armenia’s incumbent leadership has opted to sit. Lamentably, where they have currently opted to sit does not bode well for the conflict resolution process. Apart from recurring and dangerous military clashes, Yerevan has also already revealed repeated attempts to meddle with the already established formats and formulas in place since the OSCE Minsk Group mediation activity was formally authorized in 1992. Since March 2019, Armenia has spoken of the necessity of including the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent party to the negotiations, an attempt that was denied by both Azerbaijan and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

Moreover, as noted above, Armenia also denies that the Madrid Principles-based approach to the resolution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict that conditions the defining of the final status of the Nagorno–Karabakh region on the upfront withdrawal of Armenia’s occupying forces from the Azerbaijani territories was ever the subject of negotiations. The statement was rather blunt, remarking that ‘proposals that imply a phased version of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement submitted before 2018 are unacceptable for Armenia.’

Having expressed dissatisfaction with the increasingly militaristic and provocative posture demonstrated by Armenia, Azerbaijani officials and experts now believe that the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Armenia has already ended with the Pashinyan government pledging allegiance to ‘both [the] internal and international course and alliance[s] of the previous regime.’

The author of these lines also expressed cautious optimism sometime in April of this year that, against all odds, we could perhaps still hope that 2020 would be the year of a breakthrough in conflict resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. We are now well into September and, with little more than three months remaining to the end of the year, it is no longer easy to entertain hopes that any progress could be forthcoming.

Apparently, the Pashinyan government has done its best to ensure that progress remains stalled – for today, and until common sense takes over from the provocative and short-sighted foreign policy that it has inherited and rigorously pursued. This also means that Armenia’s self-imposed isolation from all regional initiatives and projects will continue, alongside its economic predicament.

Only two years on from the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution,’ we can conclude that even this ‘velvet façade’ cannot hide the nationalistic policies pursued by Armenia’s leaders, who survive on the exploitation of historical and regional sensitivities without giving a second thought to the consequences of their actions – for their nation, and for greater regional security.

https://www.eurasiareview.com/18092020-velvet-populism-ends-decade-long-discussion-of-the-madrid-principles-oped

European Union Should Play Stronger Role in the Armenia – Azerbaijan Conflict

By The London Post | 19th July 2020

The recent military escalation started on July 12 on the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan has drawn extensive international reaction. The Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS), sharing a statement on July 13, called the warring sides “to strictly respect the ceasefire, devote energy and resources to fighting the coronavirus pandemic, meaningfully re-engage in substantive negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and prepare their populations for peace.”

This time, as in the so-called “Four-Day War” between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016, the EU chose to stick to its policy of political support to the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) that is the main international institution tasked with the coordination of negotiations between the two conflicting sides and co-chaired by the EU member France along with the United States and Russia. This political approach by the EU constitutes a stark contradiction to the role and attitude it demonstrates with regards to other ethno-territorial conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

The European Union would have been expected to play a bigger role in the settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two states that take part in the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme targeting the former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. This role would also be in line with the previously declared agenda of the European Commission of President Ursula von der Leyen who had pledged to lead “a geopolitical commission”.

There are, indeed, a number of reasons for the European Union to undertake a more influential role in the resolution process of the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict and some instruments to be mobilized towards this end.

First and foremost, the EU should protect its interests in the region more assertively by taking into account a number of potential repercussions of the recent escalation for its geopolitical interests in the eastern neighbourhood in general, for its energy security in particular. As it has been widely reported in the regional and international media, the potential implications of the recent clashes extend beyond the three-decades old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and bear a key importance for the regional interests of the EU.

Above all, Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district where the recent clashes took place is a region that hosts major energy pipelines (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Southern Gas Corridor) and transportation routes (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, East – West Highway) connecting Azerbaijan with Europe through Georgia and Turkey. Any instability in this part of Azerbaijan would deal a serious blow to its connection with its Western partners with overarching consequences for both sides. This would also ruin all the investment and resources the EU has invested in the development of these bonds with Azerbaijan.

Not less importantly, the recent clashes run the risk of dramatic geopolitical expansion of the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict as the skirmishes occurred on the internationally-recognized borders between the two countries which allowed Armenia to seek the involvement the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

As, unlike the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the location of the recent clashes falls under the jurisdiction of the CSTO, Armenia could theoretically trigger the collective defence article of the Alliance. An emergency meeting of the CSTO was thus announced upon the phone conversation between Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas, but later that meeting was cancelled for unknown reasons.

There has, however, been no visible attempt by the European Union to affect the process and avert its escalation to the above-mentioned potentially dangerous stage. Nor has the EU attempted to play a role in the conflict resolution process before equivalent to its aspired geopolitical weight. Is this so because of the lack of instruments or leverage?

NO, there are actually a wide range of such means the EU could mobilize in order to play an impactful role in the region contributing to the resolution of the regional conflicts and establishment of peace and security. If this is so, how could then the European Union play a stronger role in the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict?

First of all, the office of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and crisis in Georgia can be expanded and empowered. Quite contrary to the conflict in Georgia where EU’s Special Representative holds a formal mediating role participating on behalf of the EU in Geneva International Discussions, it does not have a similar role in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Underestimating the potential the EU holds to affect the conflicting parties and giving in to other external players involved in the region, the EU has minimized its influence on the process. This approach has starkly depreciated the mandate of the EU Special Representative’s office and led it to playing a negligible role since it was formed in 2003.

It is important for the EU to take note that all the conflicts in its Eastern Neighbourhood are inherently interconnected, and a selective approach with respect to them wouldn’t produce the expected results.

Second, ideally it would be most productive if the EU can take over France’s seat in the Co-Chairmanship of the Minsk Group. Unfortunately, due to plenty of reasons, it is not possible under the existing circumstances.

The EU can, however, urge France to play a more active and assertive role in the OSCE’s Minsk Group. Any revitalization in the Minsk Group would be an important development because the conflict-affected people have apparently lost their hope and trust in the work of Minsk Group, as recently pronounced by Azerbaijan’s leader President Ilham Aliyev. On July 6, in one of his last media appearances before the start of Tovuz clashes, President Aliyev openly criticized the international mediators in the negotiations, declaring that the peace process has become “pointless”.

Last but not least, being the main trading partner of Azerbaijan accounting for around 36.7 % of its total trade and the second biggest export market of Armenia sharing also around 20 % of the country’s total trade, the EU can use this leverage in the relations with the conflicting sides and urge them to abide by the international law as repeatedly called for in the resolutions of the European Parliament and other EU documents.

For example, on 10 June, around a month before the Tovuz clashes, the members of the European Parliament reacted to the construction of a road that would directly connect Armenia and the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region and issued a joint statement characterizing the project as a violation of the international law. Concluding that the project is an attempt to “consolidate the illegal occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories”, the statement urged “the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan to conscientiously take their obligations in negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the conflict within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan”.

The EU is, however, expected to do more than only making statements and mobilize its instruments and leverage to help the sides reach a breakthrough. This is important, as otherwise the repetition of recent clashes all of a sudden and more violently would become unavoidable, endangering peace and security in the wider region.

http://thelondonpost.net/european-union-play-stronger-role-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict/

The South Caucasus Conflict and Energy Security

20 August 2020 | By Shahmar Hajiyev

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not only long contributed to instability in the South Caucasus but also prevented full regional economic integration. After a ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, Armenia continued to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, although Baku and Yerevan have continued to pursue a diplomatic settlement through the OSCE “Minsk Group”, co-presided by France, Russia and the United States.

Unfortunately, diplomatic talks mediated by the Minsk Group remain inconclusive. The current status quo in the conflict is favourable to Armenia. Illegal economic activities and settlement policy carried out by Armenia in the occupied Azerbaijani territories are contrary to the core principles of the OSCE and the UN. For instance many Armenian banks—such as Armbusinessbank, Armeconombank, and others—operate in the occupied territories.  Mobile operators such as Armentel (a subsidiary of the Russian Vimpelcom under the “Beeline” brand) and Orange Armenia (a subsidiary of Orange Group France) operate there as well.

In addition, Armenia strongly supports the energy security of the occupied territories. Gazprom Armenia, which is Armenia’s natural gas supplier and distributor, includes the occupied territories in its gas distribution network. The management of two energy-producing enterprises (“Artsakhgas” and “Artsakhenergo”) have been set up in the occupied territories and placed under the control of AEG Company, which is registered in Armenia and was tasked with integrating those territories’ energy-supply system with Armenia’s. There are also illegal settlements, as in the case of the occupied Kalbajar region, where, as of August 2020, fifteen new houses have been constructed.

The status quo in the long-running conflict is unsustainable, so there was hope for a peaceful resolution following a change in government in Armenia in 2018. Several meetings between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s new Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, however, did not succeed in resolving outstanding problems within a peaceful framework respecting international law.

The first serious military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the four-day April 2016 war took place on 12 July 2020, when Armenian military forces shelled the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan. Artillery fire killed one civilian and several soldiers on the Azerbaijani side, and Armenia also suffered military casualities. Yet any escalation only damages the peace process while sending negotiations down a blind alley.

Why would Armenia attack Azerbaijan in the Tovuz region directly on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, so far away from Nagorno-Karabakh? One view is that an important goal was to threaten inter-regional energy projects located near the conflict zone. The security of the major Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, as well as of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP, also called the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline) for natural gas, were put under threat.

From the mid-1990s Azerbaijan has supported regional economic integration, promoted international energy cooperation, and initiated wide-ranging projects for carrying Caspian crude oil and natural gas to global energy markets. First the country managed to export its Azeri Light brand oil to international energy markets via the Baku-Supsa pipeline through Georgia, and then it assured the construction of regular operation of the BTC oil pipeline. From a geoeconomic standpoint, the export of Azerbaijani energy resources to the Black Sea region via Georgia was a rational choice,

The realization of the project was a political and economic victory for both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan aimed to export its Azeri Light oil directly to the global energy markets without mixing it with Russia’s lower-quality “Urals” branded oil, which a different export route would have required. Georgia became a transit country and a bridge connecting Caspian energy resources with global energy markets. The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline opened a very important door for Georgia, enabling it to participate in future energy projects.

By opening up opportunities for Azerbaijan to export its oil to Western energy markets while bypassing Russia, the BTC pipeline opened up a new era for Azerbaijan’s economic development. No longer dependent on Russia for oil export, it could rely on Georgia and Turkey to connect it with Western energy markets.

From a geopolitical point of view, it was moreover the first project connecting the South Caucasus countries more closely with the Western world in general. It pointed toward the integration of Azerbaijan and Georgia with Europe and contributed to their economic, political, and energy security, as well as to Europe’s security of energy supply.

Between June 2006, when the pipeline became operational, and the end of the first quarter of this year, it had exported a total of 3.41 billion barrels of crude oil to global markets, including Israel. Azerbaijan’s energy cooperation with Israel has become vitally importance for Israel’s energy security, and it has given Azerbaijan the opportunity to build a special relationship with Israel. Azerbaijan supplies about 40–45 percent of Israel’s oil demand via the BTC pipeline. 

Today, Azerbaijan is also becoming an important net gas producer. The country is interested in deepening further its energy relations with the West. The discovery of the giant offshore Shah Deniz field in the late 1990s gave the original impetus to this initiative. To export Caspian gas to European energy markets, Azerbaijan initiated another energy mega-project, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), running from Baku through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania, ending in southern Italy. The total length of all segments will be 3,500 kilometres.

The European part of the SGC is called the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and SGC is on schedule to begin delivering gas to Europe this year. It should be underlined that even the COVID-19 pandemic could not prevent the implementation of this project and, by the end of May this year, the TAP project was 96 percent complete. Azerbaijani natural gas, representing the first delivery, has been already introduced into a four-kilometre section of the pipeline in Albania, between the Greek-Albanian border and up to the TAP metering station in Bilisht on 20 May 2020.

Armenia’s attack in the direction of Tovuz on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, well distant from Nagorno-Karabakh, could be characterized as a threat to these important energy projects, not just to the SGC but also to the BTC pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway.

Beginning in the 1990s, Armenia has isolated itself from such co-operative integration projects.

The people of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have suffered from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is now time to restore peace between the warring parties. Yet not only the July 2020 clashes, but also the recent remarks by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the BBC radio program Hard Talk, indicate that the Armenian government still lacks a balanced position on how to resolve the conflict.

Azerbaijan is a reliable partner for the West and contributes to Europe’s energy security. All the aforementioned pipeline projects allowed Azerbaijan to bypass Russia while exporting its natural resources to global energy markets. The current situation in the South Caucasus, especially between Azerbaijan and Armenia, prevents the region’s full integration and puts inter-regional projects at increased risk. Azerbaijan seeks real and serious progress toward a resolution of Armenia’s conflict with it.

http://natoassociation.ca/the-south-caucasus-conflict-and-energy-security/

Resuming of a Frozen Conflict: Escalating Tensions on the Azerbaijani-Armenian Border

By EMRE KÜRŞAT KAYA and SINE ÖZKARAŞAHIN | 22 July 2020

What happened?

  • On July 12, 2020, clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces broke out in the Tovuz/Tavush frontier, signaling the revival of the frozen conflict in the Caucasus. Following the events, attention has naturally turned to the Nagorno-Karabagh region, the Azerbaijani territory currently occupied by the Armenian forces.
  • Azerbaijani sources reported 12 military casualties, including several high-ranking officers. A 76-year-old Azerbaijani civilian has also been killed as a result of the Armenian shelling. While Azerbaijan claims to have neutralized 20 Armenian troops, Yerevan has announced only four casualties.

Open Source Intelligence Assessment

  • The most recent skirmish between Azerbaijan and Armenia erupted upon the Armenian artillery shelling of the Tovuz region in north-western Azerbaijan. Armenian authorities claimed that the unwarranted attack was a direct response to Azerbaijani forces trying to cross the border. So far, there is not sufficient open-source data in league with the Armenian version of the story.
  • Azerbaijani response to what it officially claims to be an Armenian violation of the ceasefire has been twofold. Azerbaijani artillery units have pounded the Armenian military positions with howitzers and mortars. Azerbaijan has also extensively used its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to penetrate into the Armenian buildup and target its rear area.
  • The extensive use of armed or unarmed drones by both sides remains one of the predominant characteristics of the spiraling escalation. Azerbaijani sources have widely shared the images of a downed Armenian tactical X-55 UAV. Sensationally, Yerevan announced to have downed 13 Azerbaijani drones including an Israeli-made Hermes 900. Baku has since refuted the claims. Moreover, Armenian sources stated that their armed forces have used an indigenous drone in active combat for the first time.
  • While there is not enough tangible proof to confirm most of the material loses, the information warfare aspect of the conflict is much easier to recognize. Both sides have used their respective MoDs’ official social media accounts to share daily drone footages of airstrikes and shelling. Following the trend in other conflict zones such as Syria and Libya, Baku and Yerevan grasped the significance of winning the information warfare along with the physical battle-space.

Geopolitical Assessment

  • Since the start of the recent escalation, Ankara has firmly stood with Baku, its staunch ally. President Erdogan stated that Turkey would never hesitate to protect Azerbaijan if and when needed[3]. On the same note, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Cavusoglu added that Turkey stands with Azerbaijan with all its capabilities.
  • Those strong messages are soon to be backed by more intensified military-to-military and defense cooperation between Ankara and Baku. Notably, Ismail Demir, Turkey’s procurement chief, hinted at the transfer of Turkish indigenous UAVs and electronic warfare systems to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
  • According to SIPRI’s 2019 Trade in International Arms Transfers report, Armenia’s arms imports have increased by 415 percent between 2010–14 and 2015–19, and 94 percent of its arsenal came from Russia [in the latter period][4]. Azerbaijan’s arms imports were 3.3 times higher compared to Armenia through the same timeframe. It ranked 30th in the top 40 largest importers of major arms, with Israel, Russia, and Turkey as its three main suppliers. According to SIPRI, between 2015 and 2019, both Armenia and Azerbaijan “have imported missiles capable of attacking targets deep inside each other’s territories”.
  • The arms race in the Caucasus, coupled with the frozen conflict revolving around the occupied Azerbaijani territories, sets a dangerous flashpoint to monitor. The risk of inter-state war cannot be neglected at the time being.

[1] Map prepared by AFP’s Aude GENET, accessed on 17 July 2020 from https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1283656830204272642

[2] Azerbaijani MoD’s Official Twitter Account, accessed on 17 July 2020 from https://twitter.com/wwwmodgovaz/status/1283669752330813441

[3] 2020. Turkey Will Never Hesitate To Stand Against Any Attacks On The Rights Of Azerbaijan. [online]Available at: < https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/120652/-we-will-never-leave-azerbaijan-alone- > [Accessed 19 July 2020].

[4] SIPRI, 2019. 2019 Trade In International Arms Transfers. [online]Available at: < https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2019 > [Accessed 19 July 2020].

Adviser to Azerbaijan’s president: ‘We are expecting provocation from Armenia at any moment’ – Video

22 July 2020 14:00 | By Marc Perelman

In an interview with FRANCE 24, Hikmet Hajiyev, a senior adviser to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, reacted to the recent flare-up in violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At least 16 people have been killed on the border in the worst violence in the region since 2016. Hajiyev said that Armenia had deliberately pursued a policy of aggression towards his country and warned that he was expecting further military moves from Armenia “at any moment”. He also accused Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of advancing a bellicose nationalist agenda.

 The senior adviser to Azerbaijan’s president said the situation at the border with Armenia reminded him of World War I between France and Germany, with heavily armed soldiers facing each other in border trenches. Hajiyev warned that any spark could lead to a full-blown conflict. He accused Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of advancing a bellicose nationalist agenda despite claims when he was elected that he wanted to achieve peace with Azerbaijan.

Hajiyev said the threat by Azerbaijan to strike a civilian nuclear plant in Armenia had been made by a low-level military officer and did not reflect his country’s official stance. He went on to accuse Armenia of targeting civilian targets in his country.

He brushed aside claims that Turkey was the reason for the recent flare-up of tension and said that Baku was ready to address and resolve the long-standing conflict with Armenia. 

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20200722-interview-adviser-to-azerbaijan-s-president-we-are-expecting-provocation-from-armenia-at-any-moment?ref=tw

Azerbaijan–Turkey Strategic Alliance Deepens amid Recent Conflicts

22 September 2020 | By Vasif Huseynov

The relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been on a developing course since the very beginning of the former’s post-Soviet independence, and has now arguably reached its hitherto peak. The unequivocal support by Turkish leaders to Azerbaijan amidst the escalation of its conflict with Armenia, the subsequent joint exercises and drills between their armed forces, and frequent mutual visits of high-ranking officials regardless of the pandemic are some of the highlights in the bilateral relations of the two countries in recent months. While the ethnic kinship and cultural proximity constitute the cornerstone of these bonds, these are common interests and security threats that lead the two brotherly nations toward building a strategic alliance.  

“One nation, two states”

The two Turkic states that often laud their bonds under the motto “one nation, two states” have to deal with common security threats posed by Armenia’s territorial claims and Russia’s military presence and security interests in the South Caucasus. Armenia hosts Russia’s military base in Gyumri, a city 10 kilometers away from the Turkish border, which is supposed to serve, among others, Russia’s aim to exert pressure on Turkey from its eastern borders. It is widely assumed that Armenia would have not been able to sustain its control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and surrounding districts without Russian military support. 

These threats were out there since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but they have recently gained momentum following reckless statements from Armenia’s leadership, the military attacks (July 12 – 15) by the armed forces of Armenia on the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan where all the transportation and energy routes (such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway) connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey pass through, and Russia’s increasing arms supply to Armenia in the wake of Tovuz escalation. 

Armenia’s rejection of the Madrid principles, a settlement mechanism for the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict which was long perceived as the most feasible way to reach an agreement, and the implicit adoption of the articles of the Treaty of Sevres (1920) as foreign policy objectives by the country’s leadership, have further complicated the regional situation and pushed it to the edge of war. 

It is important to recall that the Treaty of Sevres, of which 100th anniversary was celebrated in Armenia with addressees from the prime minister and president of the country, was an attempt by the Allies of World War I to liquidate the Ottoman Empire and share its territories. According to the treaty, the northeastern parts of modern Turkey were planned to be put under the control of Armenia. If realized, the Republic of Armenia would have covered a territory of over 160 thousand square kilometers, with a marked difference from the present size of less than 30 thousand square kilometers. The treaty never came into force and was soon replaced by another treaty – the Treaty of Lausanne – by which the international borders of the modern Turkey were officially recognized.

The legal basis and technical feasibility of the cooperation Azerbaijan and Turkey has built over recent decades to allow them to jointly address these challenges. Most importantly, the two countries established the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support (ASPMS) in 2010 that included a principle akin to NATO’s Article 5, which, in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, obligates both parties to cooperate when either country faces aggression from a third state or group of states. The agreement also provides a legal basis for the expansion of military cooperation, including regular joint military exercises and drills in both countries. 

Along with expanding economic partnership (e.g. Azerbaijan’s becoming top supplier of natural gas to the Turkish market this year), the two countries have deepened their partnership in the supply of arms and other military equipment. Azerbaijan declared an interest in obtaining Turkey’s military drones that proved significantly effective in Ankara’s military operations in Libya and Syria. Baku and Ankara have reportedly reached a deal on the supply of these drones worth $200 million. According to local experts, Turkey is likely to overtake Russia’s place as Azerbaijan’s second-largest arms importer after Israel.

Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, is confronting Armenia and its external patrons more assertively.

The practical implications of the close relationship between Baku and Ankara were clearly observed on the heels of recent Armenia–Azerbaijan border clashes. Partly due to the fact that the clashes occurred on an area near Azerbaijan’s main transportation and energy routes, and in light of suspicions that Armenia’s attacks were externally supported, Ankara took a strong position. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, condemning the offensive against the military units of Azerbaijan, called it “beyond Armenia’s caliber,” in an implicit criticism of Russia’s possible role. 

In the wake of the military drills of the armed forces of Armenia and Russia that was widely seen as a response to the July clashes, Ankara and Baku declared to hold joint military exercises which were originally planned to last 13 days (July 29 – August 10), but are now reportedly still being held, albeit at a smaller scale. Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry refuted the claims linking the drills to the July escalation and asserted that they were held “according to the annual plan” of the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support (ASPMS) of 2010. Truly, the sides have been holding increasingly more intensive and numerous military drills since the establishment of the ASPMS. For example, the armed forces of both countries organized up to 13 exercises in 2019 with a notable increase from those (7 exercises) in 2018. 

This year’s exercises, apart from being the largest of their kind in the recent history of military cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan, were of great significance for the latter as Turkey would have likely transferred the experience it has gathered in the use of attack drones, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and air-defense systems to Azerbaijan. The drills involved military personnel, armored vehicles, artillery mounts and mortars, as well as military aviation and air-defense equipment. 

The Turkish support has apparently emboldened Azerbaijan to more assertively confront Armenia and its external patrons. Most importantly, Baku has recently mounted strong opposition against the arms supply of Russia to Armenia which is argued to have started immediately after the July clashes, and still not stopped. 

Azerbaijan is interested in the advance of bilateral relations with Turkey in other spheres as well. 

This was the main purpose of the visit of Hikmet Hajiyev, Azerbaijan’s presidential aide on foreign policy, to Turkey on September 7. In the course of the visit, the sides announced the formation of media platform to integrate the media sources of the two countries and to “fight black propagandas” side-by-side. Fahrettun Altun, communications director of Turkey, praised the agreement and said, “The improvement in cooperation in media, communications and the public diplomacy with Baku is a matter of life and death.” 

Hikmet Hajiyev’s visit was followed by the visit of a parliamentary delegation headed by Sahiba Gafarova, the speaker of the Parliament, on September 11. Meeting with Turkey’s Minister of Trade Ruhsar Pekcan, Gafarova declared Azerbaijan’s interest in expanding bilateral trade between the two countries. The Turkish Minister reaffirmed that the existing trade turnover of $4.4 billion “doesn’t reflect the true potential of the two countries,” adding, Turkey aims to sign an “agreement on free trade with Azerbaijan,” which would build up on the recently signed preferential trade agreement between the two sides.

Another war on the horizon in the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict?

22 September 2020 | By Vasif Huseynov

The deadlock in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process coupled with the concentration of foreign fighters and transfer of arms in Armenia is a distressing signal for an imminent escalation or a new war, writes Vasif Huseynov.

Armenia is “preparing for a new war. They are concentrating their forces near the line of contact… We follow their actions. Of course, we will defend ourselves”, said Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in an interview with local television channels on 19 September.

A day after this statement, tensions rose markedly on the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

As a result of this escalation, according to the report shared by the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan in the morning of 21 September, an Azerbaijani soldier was killed by the armed forces of Armenia in the Tovuz direction on the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border.

A day before this incidence, the Azerbaijani army downed an Armenian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the country’s Defense Ministry announced.

Although the official statement did not reveal where the UAV was downed, the local media reported it to have taken place in Shamkir province of Azerbaijan in the neighbourhood of Tovuz region where deadly clashes flared-up in July with up to 20 military servicemen on both sides and an Azerbaijani civilian being killed.

“Recently, there has been an increase in cases of gross violations of the ceasefire by the units of the armed forces of Armenia, regular shelling of our public settlements, civilians, and infrastructure near the line of contact, the use of larger-calibre weapons, reconnaissance-sabotage activities against the positions of our units, as well as the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have led to a serious aggravation of the situation on the frontline,” the statement of the Ministry added.

This happened against the backdrop of the news reported by the Egyptian news website cairo24.com about the transfer of terrorist groups of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê‎ – PKK) and People’s Protection Forces (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎—YPG) to Armenia using the transit route of Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Since the July clashes, Azerbaijan has been warning also about Russia’s shipment of tons of arms to Armenia through a complex transportation route using the Caspian littoral states’ airspace, as the shorter route via Georgia was not available owing to the objection of the Georgian government.

Condemning this cooperation between Armenia and its external supporters, President Aliyev declared that the cargo flights carrying arms from Russia to Armenia persisted in the early September, adding that this “possesses the existential threat to Azerbaijan because using these weapons… [Armenians] kill our military servicemen, they kill civilians”.

This confrontational environment in the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan was provoked by the admitted failure of negotiations between the sides. The peace process brokered by the Minsk Group of the OSCE, co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States, has failed to deliver a breakthrough for the last three decades.

Armenia’s rejection of the Madrid Principles, a conflict settlement formulation proposed by the Minsk Group and was long championed by the peacebuilding regional and international players, was seen as the final nail in the coffin of negotiations.

Azerbaijan laments that Armenia has abused the peace negotiations to consolidate its control over the occupied territories of Azerbaijan instead of embracing it as a historic chance to resolve the longstanding conflict and putting an end to the consistent bloodshed in the region.

As an attempt to revitalize the negotiations and confront the dangerous dynamics in the conflict following the July escalation, the Azerbaijani government called for the meeting of the Minsk Group in an extended format which would include not only the Co-Chairs but also other members of the 11-state institution.

Armenia in its turn put forward seven conditions for negotiations, further complicating the process. These conditions, which were an apparent attempt to derail negotiations completely, included elements, such as the participation of the occupational regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh as a full-fledged party in the negotiations, which were previously rejected by both Azerbaijan and the OSCE’s Minsk Group.

This deadlock in the negotiation process coupled with the concentration of foreign fighters and transfer of arms in Armenia is a distressing signal for an imminent escalation or a new war as President Aliyev warned.

Azerbaijan hopes the international community, including the European Union, will immediately react, prevent the resumption of military hostilities and push for substantive negotiations between the two conflicting states.

Restorative Justice In Context Of Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict – OpEd

23 August 2020 | By Esmira Jafarova

It is necessary to discuss the decades-long Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict from the prisms of restorative justice. In conflict resolution literature, “restorative justice” envisages a set of actions for soothing hostilities between the conflicting parties. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict started with an armed military assault launched by Armenia against Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The war (1988-1994) resulted in Armenia’s occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent regions, whist the four UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) demanding the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories are still ignored. Conflict resolution has so far remained elusive, despite the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group’s Co-Chairmanship Institute, which includes the United States, France and Russia, has been working on this gargantuan task since 1997. To approach a resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, it is necessary that Armenia negotiate with the principles of restorative justice in mind.

Despite the fact that several meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries were held in 2019 and positive dynamism was noted on the human track with mutual visits of journalists taking place for the first time, substantial progress was not achieved in the negotiations. Therefore, the year 2019 was dubbed as the “lost year for the conflict settlement.” In January 2020, a meeting between the Foreign Ministers in Geneva took place, which was followed by the much-discussed Munich debate between President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in February. This debate was assessed by some experts as being rather counterproductive, as it enhanced contradictions and did not contribute to the approximation of positions of the conflicting parties.

Then came the so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” held by Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the results of which were not recognized by any member of the international community. The elections resulted in the Shusha provocation when the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city of great moral and cultural significance for Azerbaijan. Incendiary comments by Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan denying Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov’s words about the fact that the staged and step-by-step solution of the conflict was ever the subject of negotiations, added more fuel to the fire.

Against this backdrop, military exercises were held by the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan in May, including in Nakhichevan, while the country also stepped up its military purchases from abroad. Azerbaijan’s purchases were initiated through the recent ratification of the military-financial agreement by the parliament on May 31, which enables Azerbaijan to buy new weapons from Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. Turkish drones are considered to be a serious option among the wide array of choices that are available under the agreement.

From July 12 to 14, Armenia violated the ceasefire, this time on the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan. After the attack was stopped by Azerbaijan, international actors, including the European Union, OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, and the Russian Federation called for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Moreover, COVID-19-induced lockdowns have further thrown a wrench into the negotiation process. The parties met during the pandemic on April 21 and June 29 through 30 via a video conference between the foreign ministers Mammadyarov and Mnatsakanyan with the participation of Minsk Group co-chairs Igor Popov of Russia, Stephane Visconti of France, Andrew Schofer, of the United States, and Andrej Kasprzyk, the personal representative of the OSCE chairperson-in-office. The joint statement of the April 21 meeting stated that given the current unprecedented challenges faced by people all over the world, “…the Foreign Ministers and the Co-Chairs expressed the hope that the resolve seen in the global pandemic response will bring a creative and constructive impetus to the peace process.” Furthermore, the co-chairs, in the joint statement of June 29 and 30 meeting, called upon the parties “to take additional steps to strengthen the ceasefire and to prepare the populations for peace.”

Given the context of stalemate, the concept of restorative justice to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict becomes important to consider. Restorative justice, a term that stems from conflict resolution literature, means taking actions towards reducing animosity between the conflicting parties. The proponents of this idea argue that “the punishment of the offenders alone does not prevent them from continuing to hate the other side.” Therefore, it is best that “the offenders take the responsibility of acknowledging their offense and get motivated to change the relationship from destructive to constructive.” The concept does not merely seek to compensate the victims for the losses it incurred at the hand of the offender. It also necessitates that existing systems be revised so that injustices perpetrated in the past would no longer be possible in future.

These elements of restorative justice, especially the latter concerning the necessity to revise existing systems, must become a part of Armenia’s policy during this conflict resolution and a subsequent peacemaking process. Acceptance of all wrongdoings towards Azerbaijan and genuine intention to work towards fair and lasting peace based on the norms and principles of international law, including respect for sovereignty, may lay the foundation for achieving restorative justice in this rocky neighborhood.

Denial of the meager progress achieved in the negotiation process so far, just as Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan recently vocalized, further jeopardizes the already tenuous situation and slims the prospects for restorative justice. Moreover, in-your-face kind of provocations initiated by Armenian leadership — first in Khankendi in November 2019 where Pashinyan brazenly declared that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, period” and later in the aforementioned Shusha provocation and blatant violations of the ceasefire, including the recent Tovuz provocation – all undermine hopes that some sort of progress might be possible this year. Rather than exacerbate the conflict, nations should seek good neighborly relations and peaceful co-existence within the region they belong to. This is critical for the South Caucasus, a region incredibly disintegrated due to the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

There are three important steps therefore that Armenia has to take towards attaining restorative justice. First, Armenia must assume responsibility for its decades-long military occupation. Second, Armenia must genuinely engage in negotiations towards peaceful resolution of the conflict based on respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the highest degree of self-rule offered by Azerbaijan to the Nagorno-Karabakh region as a part of future settlement formula. Third, Armenia must work in tandem with other neighbors towards the improvement of regional architecture and pursue good relations with all states in the region, including Azerbaijan. These steps will, in return, attract similar cooperative moves by Azerbaijan in the form of opening of communications, borders with Armenia and its inclusion into all large-scale regional energy and infrastructure projects implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners. Taking such actions may also mean that Armenia and Azerbaijan could finally reengage and reintegrate their populations and societies.

Restorative justice, which involves the conflicting parties in a dialogue, “encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions and offer an apology, toward the reestablishment of a consensus between the parties.” Restorative justice is often juxtaposed to “retributive justice,” which mostly carries the punishment connotation to the offender, whereas restorative justice aims at soothing the animosity and hostility between the parties upon the acknowledgement by the offender of its own disruptive deeds. This in its own turn will create an environment where the offender and victim could co-exist in future.

Occupation of Azerbaijani territories is undermining the prospects for restorative justice. Armenia therefore must engage in constructive negotiations with Azerbaijan towards the attainment of just and lasting solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, to the greater benefit of itself, as well as regional stability and cooperation. It should be in the best interest of Armenia to work towards achieving restorative justice with Azerbaijan and finally assume responsibility for its actions, having thus laid the foundation for peace and co-existence with the Azerbaijani population in the South Caucasus.

https://www.eurasiareview.com/23082020-restorative-justice-in-context-of-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-oped/

Armenia’s attack against Tovuz is also an attack against Europe’s energy security

24 July 2020 | By Dr. Esmira Jafarova

The recent escalation of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this time along the international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan in the aftermath of an armed attack launched by Armenia on July12–14, 2020,had been brewing for some time before finally boiling over into full-fledged military clashes, the worst in recent years, that caused causalities and destruction on both sides. Azerbaijan lost more than 10 servicemen, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian. There are many reasons why this attack happened in this particular border area (and not along the Line of Contact, as usual) and at this particular time, but in this piece I want specifically to focus on one of them and, in concurrence with other internationally recognized scholars in this field, assert that this attack against Azerbaijan should be considered as an attack against Europe’s energy security and well-being.

To begin, a brief review of the history of recent developments in conflict resolution testifies that, although the year 2019 was relatively incident free along the Line of Contact between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and for the first time in many years mutual visits of journalists took pace, the year was also identified as the “lost year for the conflict settlement” owing to the lack of progress in the negotiations. This absence of progress was accompanied by incendiary rhetoric employed by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who, having ascended to power on the back of the many alluring promises of the so-called “Velvet Revolution,” found himself grappling to deliver on those ambitious reform pledges. The harbingers of heightening hostility were seen in Pashinyan’s infamous declaration during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi on August 5,2019, when he said that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all;” as well as his continuous insistence on changing the negotiation format –already established by the relevant decisions of the OSCE –to include representatives of the puppet regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent party to the peace negotiations.

The year 2020 started off with the January meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, and in April and June two virtual meetings were held because of COVID-19 lockdowns; however, hopes for any positive progress quickly subsided in the wake of other negative developments. The so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” that were held by Armenia in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan on March31, 2020, were condemned by the international community. These mock elections later culminated in the Shusha provocation,in which the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city that carries great moral significance for Azerbaijan. The last straw in a hostile build-up was the denial by Pashinyan of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s comments about a staged, step-by-step solution to the conflict; Pashinyan denied that this was ever the subject of negotiations. The very recent threats by the Armenian Ministry of Defense, which publicly threatened “to occupy new advantageous positions” in Azerbaijan, further testified to the increasingly militaristic mood among Armenia’s upper echelons.

This litany of discouraging events relating to the peace process over the last year and a half in some ways heralded what we witnessed on July12–14, 2020.This attack against Azerbaijan along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects the deep frustration of the Pashinyan regime in its inability to bring about the promised changes. Economic problems were heightened by the COVID-19-induced challenge and decreasing foreign assistance, and this was all happening against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s increasing successes domestically, economically and internationally. Azerbaijan has long been established as an important provider of energy security and sustainable development for Europe through the energy projects that it is implementing together with its international partners. The Baku–Tbilisi–Supsa Western Export (1998) and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (2005) oil pipelines and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (2006) gas pipeline have enhanced Azerbaijan’s role as an energy producing and exporting country, and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is already becoming a reality. This 3500-km-long Corridor comprises four segments – the Shah Deniz-II project, Southern Caucasus Pipeline Extension (SCPX), Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its final portion, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The Corridor passes through seven countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy – with Italy being the final destination receiving Caspian gas. Turkey is already receiving gas via TANAP and is contracted to accept up to 6 billion cubic meters of gas via this pipeline. Europe is expected to receive 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per year, and the first gas has already arrived on Albanian territory. The SGC is scheduled to be fully operational by fall 2020 and TAP is almost complete. Things are progressing uninhibitedly and even the COVID-19 pandemic has been unable topreventthe success of the SGC. This Corridor stands as one of the guarantors of Europe’s energy security by providing diversification of energy sources and routes, even despite Europe’s Green Deal, which also acknowledges the continent’s long-term demand for gas.

Such critical infrastructure, vital for Europe’s energy security, passes close to the border area that includes the Tovuz district attacked by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia on July12–14. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus that is isolated from these regional energy projects owing to its policy of expansion and occupation. It is thus the only country that does not have anything to losefrom creating chaos and destruction around this critical energy infrastructure. Jealousy and the feeling of self-imposed isolation from all regional cooperation initiatives have no doubt increased Armenia’s hostility toward these energy projects. Further vivid evidence of Armenia’s belligerence against Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure was provided by its threat to attack the Mingachevir Dam, a civilian infrastructure project that is also a vital component of Azerbaijan’s largest hydroelectric power plant. Hydroelectric power comprises the largest component in Azerbaijan’s renewable energy potential, today standing at around 17–18%ofthe overall energy balance of the country. It is not difficult to imagine the magnitude of civilian causalities in case such a destruction materializes. 

By conducting this act of aggression against Azerbaijan along the international border in the direction of Tovuz, Armenia wanted firstly, to divert attention from its own internal problems. Secondly, the regime desired to disguise its failures on the international front, especially recently when Azerbaijan initiated the summoning of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly related to COVID-19,convened on July 10, that was supported by more than 130 members of the UN. Thirdly, Armenia wanted to drag in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against Azerbaijan by invoking Article 4, which states: “… if one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty…”.Fourthly, and the central thesis of this article, Armenia intended to target critical energy infrastructure implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners, thereby jeopardizing the energy security of not only the neighboring region, but also of the greater European continent. The aforementioned existing oil and gas infrastructure aside, the SGC is set to be fully operational by fall 2020, and this multibillion-dollar megaproject offers economic, social and many other benefits to all participating countries involved in the construction and implementation of this project. Any damage to this critical infrastructure would deal a heavy blow to the current and future sustainable development of Europe.

Europe must therefore be vigilant regarding such provocations. International actors, including the European Union,OSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, United States, and the Russian Federation, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, given what is at stake,including this time the crucial energy infrastructure, had Armenia’sattack not been proportionately parried by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, the statement made by the European Union about this recent military attack could have contained stronger language beyond just “…urging both sides to stop the armed confrontation, refrain from action and rhetoric that provoke tension, and undertake immediate measures to prevent further escalation… .” Naming and shaming the aggressor appropriately is indispensable in this situation. As Mr. Hikmat Hajiyev, Head of Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration and Adviser to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Foreign Affairs, also noted: “the EU should distinguish between the aggressor and the subject of aggression.”

In the 21st century, the international community should not tolerate such flagrant violations of international law; disrespect of UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) and other relevant international documents calling for an end to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories; and the feeling of impunity in instigating an attack against a sovereign state, a neighbor, and a crucial player in the realization of critical energy infrastructure projects key to Europe’s own energy security. Azerbaijan has long put up with such aggression and the occupation of its internationally recognized territories in Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, and has opted for negotiations toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. Yet the aggressor cannot be allowed to continue its attacks against other parts of Azerbaijan– this time Tovuz –thereby jeopardizing not only the latter, but also energy security and sustainable development of the greater European continent just because such provocations seem to offer an escape from the regime’s domestic and external problems. Such practices should be condemned in the strongest possible terms. This should be done not only for the sake of Azerbaijan and regional security in the South Caucasus, but in the name of Europe’s own energy security and well-being.

What is behind Armenia’s military provocation on Azerbaijan’s border?

BY SEYMUR MAMMADOV | JUL 24, 2020 | 12:05 AM GMT+3

The fierce skirmishes that broke out on July 12 around Tovuz, along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, which claimed the lives of many, have caused enormous unease in the international community. Repeated appeals from Russia, the U.S., Iran, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Minsk Group, authoritative international organizations and other groups calling on all parties to show restraint and refrain from any threat of force have so far had no effect.

In these difficult days for the Azerbaijani people – who heroically repelled the military provocation by Armenia, losing many noble sons in the process – it is gratifying to observe not only the solidarity of our citizens but also the support from our brothers in Turkey. Turkish F-16 fighters have made maneuvers along the border with Armenia in a show of support for Azerbaijan.

It is our brother Turkey that is the only country that has repeatedly made statements in support of Azerbaijan in an open form, threatening Armenia with retaliation for attacks on the Tovuz region. This will never be forgotten in Azerbaijan and is highly appreciated.

However, the situation on the border of the two conflicting countries remains very tense, because if the fighting continues for several more days, there is a risk of transferring the theater of military operations to the Karabakh front, in which case, the local conflict may eventually turn into a regional conflict. This is an outcome that officials in Baku have no interest in. It seems that Yerevan is determined to continue hostilities in order to involve regional players – Russia, Iran and even the CSTO – in this conflict.

Russia and Iran have made it clear that they support neither party. Armenia’s plan to involve the CSTO in the border conflict has also failed miserably – the organization called on both sides to end hostilities and does not support Armenia for the simple reason that Baku has fairly good relations with member states of the organization. In addition, CSTO member states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – are well aware that in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict Baku is a victim, and Yerevan is an occupier that has blatantly ignored four Security Council resolutions on the withdrawal of its troops from Azerbaijani territories – namely Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions.

The escalation of the conflict at the border was preceded by several important developments.

First, a year ago a decision was made in Azerbaijan to transfer the state border with Armenia to the State Border Service (SBS). Before this, units of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry were stationed here.

And thus, officials in Baku decided to reduce tension in these sections of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border – yet this provided the Armenian side with a good opportunity to organize a military provocation against the border guards. A year after the decision on the Azerbaijani side, Yerevan has implemented its long-awaited plan to provoke fighting in the Tovuz area of Azerbaijan. But why Tovuz?

Several strategically important pipelines pass not far from the site of hostilities – namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor, which play an important part in ensuring Europe’s energy security. Almost two months before the Armenian provocation – as part of the test launch of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) built to transport Azerbaijani gas to Europe – the first batch of gas from Azerbaijan reached the territory of Albania. In fact, this is an open provocation against oil and gas projects that meet the national interests of not only Azerbaijan but also Turkey.

With the launch of the oil and gas pipelines, Armenia was completely removed from all regional projects, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. Since the transport blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey impedes the economic development of Armenia, the latter decided to try to lessen the economic opportunities Baku could enjoy through a military provocation in the Tovuz direction.

Secondly, after coming to power, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinian began to make exaggerated claims to his strategic ally Russia and the CSTO. Suffice it to recall the scandal with the arrest in Yerevan of the CSTO Secretary General Yuri Khachaturov and the many months Yerevan obstructed the process of electing a new secretary-general. The Armenian leadership tried to get the CSTO to openly support the country in the conflict with Azerbaijan. However, Pashinian was clearly made to understand that the military actions in Karabakh were a domestic issue for Azerbaijan according to international law and that this was not part of the CSTO’s responsibilities.

He then realized what former Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan’s main mistake was – and that it would be necessary to advance military clashes not on the Karabakh front, but on the state border. I would like to note that military clashes with Azerbaijan took place just three days after the Pashinian’s son Ashot Pashinian completed his military service. This coincidence is not accidental since over the past two years Pashinian’s son has been in the enlisted army, the situation on the front line has been a little calm.

Of course, there is another reason for the Armenian provocation. The fact is that the military actions in Karabakh are perceived by the Armenians as taking place on foreign territory, far from the borders of Armenia.

Despite the large-scale propaganda work of Armenia, Armenians still deep down understand that Karabakh is a foreign land and that military operations have nothing to do with their security.

But the hostilities on the state border are still a threat designed to make Armenians forget about everything else – including the country’s deep economic crisis, rising unemployment, poverty and the negative consequences of the pandemic for the economy.

Summing up the above, I will add that clashes on the border and on the Karabakh front would continue until the Armenian diplomats sit at the negotiating table and agree to conduct substantive negotiations with the Azerbaijani side on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The only solution to the conflict is compliance with the four relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile Baku, in turn, is ready to provide Nagorno-Karabakh with wider autonomy under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan with a guarantee of the full provision of civil, socioeconomic and cultural rights of Armenians living there in accordance Azerbaijani and international law.

https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/what-is-behind-armenias-military-provocation-on-azerbaijans-border

Restorative justice in the context of the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict

24 September 2020 | By Esmira Jafarova

The occupation of Azerbaijani territories is undermining the prospects for restorative justice.  Armenia therefore must engage in constructive negotiations with Azerbaijan towards the attainment of just and lasting solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, to the greater benefit of itself, as well as regional stability and cooperation. It should be in the best interest of Armenia to work towards achieving restorative justice with Azerbaijan and finally assume responsibility for its actions, having thus laid the foundation for peace and co-existence with the Azerbaijani population in the South Caucasus.

It is necessary to discuss the decades-long Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict from the prisms of restorative justice. In conflict resolution literature, “restorative justice” envisages a set of actions for soothing hostilities between the conflicting parties. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict started with an armed military assault launched by Armenia against Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The war (1988-1994) resulted in Armenia’s occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent regions, whist the four UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) demanding the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories are still ignored. Conflict resolution has so far remained elusive, despite the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group’s Co-Chairmanship Institute, which includes the United States, France and Russia, has been working on this gargantuan task since 1997. To approach a resolution to the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict, it is necessary that Armenia negotiate with the principles of restorative justice in mind.

Despite the fact that several meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries were held in 2019 and positive dynamism was noted on the human track with mutual visits of journalists taking place for the first time, substantial progress was not achieved in the negotiations. Therefore, the year 2019 was dubbed as the “lost year for the conflict settlement.” In January 2020, a meeting between the Foreign Ministers in Geneva took place, which was followed by the much-discussed Munich debate between President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan in February. This debate was assessed by some experts as being rather counterproductive, as it enhanced contradictions and did not contribute to the approximation of positions of the conflicting parties.

Then came the so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” held by Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the results of which were not recognized by any member of the international community. The elections resulted in the Shusha provocation when the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city of great moral and cultural significance for Azerbaijan. Incendiary comments by Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan denying Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov’s words about the fact that the staged and step-by-step solution of the conflict was ever the subject of negotiations, added more fuel to the fire.

Against this backdrop, military exercises were held by the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan in May, including in Nakhichevan, while the country also stepped up its military purchases from abroad. Azerbaijan’s purchases were initiated through the recent ratification of the military-financial agreement by the parliament on May 31, which enables Azerbaijan to buy new weapons from Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. Turkish drones are considered to be a serious option among the wide array of choices that are available under the agreement.

From July 12 to 14, Armenia violated the ceasefire, this time on the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan. After the attack was stopped by Azerbaijan, international actors, including the European Union, OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, and the Russian Federation called for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Moreover, COVID-19-induced lockdowns have further thrown a wrench into the negotiation process. The parties met during the pandemic on April 21 and June 29 through 30 via a video conference between the foreign ministers Mammadyarov and Mnatsakanyan with the participation of Minsk Group co-chairs Igor Popov of Russia, Stephane Visconti of France, Andrew Schofer, of the United States, and Andrej Kasprzyk, the personal representative of the OSCE chairperson-in-office. The joint statement of the April 21 meeting stated that given the current unprecedented challenges faced by people all over the world, “…the Foreign Ministers and the Co-Chairs expressed the hope that the resolve seen in the global pandemic response will bring a creative and constructive impetus to the peace process.” Furthermore, the co-chairs, in the joint statement of June 29 and 30 meeting, called upon the parties “to take additional steps to strengthen the ceasefire and to prepare the populations for peace.”

Given the context of stalemate, the concept of restorative justice to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict becomes important to consider.  Restorative justice, a term that stems from conflict resolution literature, means taking actions towards reducing animosity between the conflicting parties. The proponents of this idea argue that “the punishment of the offenders alone does not prevent them from continuing to hate the other side.” Therefore, it is best that “the offenders take the responsibility of acknowledging their offense and get motivated to change the relationship from destructive to constructive.” The concept does not merely seek to compensate the victims for the losses it incurred at the hand of the offender. It also necessitates that existing systems be revised so that injustices perpetrated in the past would no longer be possible in future.

These elements of restorative justice, especially the latter concerning the necessity to revise existing systems, must become a part of Armenia’s policy during this conflict resolution and a subsequent peacemaking process. Acceptance of all wrongdoings towards Azerbaijan and genuine intention to work towards fair and lasting peace based on the norms and principles of international law, including respect for sovereignty, may lay the foundation for achieving restorative justice in this rocky neighborhood.

Denial of the meager progress achieved in the negotiation process so far, just as Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan recently vocalized, further jeopardizes the already tenuous situation and slims the prospects for restorative justice. Moreover, in-your-face kind of provocations initiated by Armenian leadership — first in Khankendi in November 2019 where Pashinyan brazenly declared that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, period” and later in the aforementioned Shusha provocation and blatant violations of the ceasefire, including the recent Tovuz provocation – all undermine hopes that some sort of progress might be possible this year. Rather than exacerbate the conflict, nations should seek good neighborly relations and peaceful co-existence within the region they belong to. This is critical for the South Caucasus, a region incredibly disintegrated due to the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

There are three important steps therefore that Armenia has to take towards attaining restorative justice. First,  Armenia must assume responsibility for its decades-long military occupation. Second, Armenia must genuinely engage in negotiations towards peaceful resolution of the conflict      based on respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the highest degree of self-rule offered by Azerbaijan to the Nagorno-Karabakh region as a part of future settlement formula. Third, Armenia must work in tandem with other neighbors towards the improvement of regional architecture and pursue good relations with all states in the region, including Azerbaijan. These steps will, in return, attract similar cooperative moves by Azerbaijan in the form of opening of communications, borders with Armenia and its inclusion into all large-scale regional energy and infrastructure projects implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners. Taking such actions may also mean that Armenia and Azerbaijan could finally reengage and reintegrate their populations and societies.

Restorative justice, which involves the conflicting parties in a dialogue, “encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions and offer an apology, toward the reestablishment of a consensus between the parties.” Restorative justice is often juxtaposed to “retributive justice,” which mostly carries the punishment connotation to the offender, whereas restorative justice aims at soothing the animosity and hostility between the parties upon the acknowledgement by the offender of its own disruptive deeds. This in its own turn will create an environment where the offender and victim could co-exist in future.

The occupation of Azerbaijani territories is undermining the prospects for restorative justice.  Armenia therefore must engage in constructive negotiations with Azerbaijan towards the attainment of just and lasting solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, to the greater benefit of itself, as well as regional stability and cooperation. It should be in the best interest of Armenia to work towards achieving restorative justice with Azerbaijan and finally assume responsibility for its actions, having thus laid the foundation for peace and co-existence with the Azerbaijani population in the South Caucasus.

https://blacksea-caspia.eu/en/321-08-05-20

Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes put a squeeze on ‘Ganja Gap’

27 July 2020 | By LUKE COFFEY

On July 12, the Azerbaijani village of Aghdam in the Tovuz district, nestled along the border with Armenia, was shelled by Armenian forces. This incident led to the deaths of four Azerbaijani soldiers. In the subsequent days, a number of skirmishes between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces killed dozens of civilians and soldiers on each side.

As expected, both sides blame the other for the flare-up in hostilities. Due to the remoteness of the region and usual lack of transparency by both sides in the conflict, specific details remain unknown.

Since 1988, when Armenia made territorial claims to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the two sides have been in a protracted conflict. Sometimes the bullets are flying; at other times the front lines are relatively calm. Over the years, the conflict has been allowed to fester with no resolution in sight. 

The war in the early 1990s was a bloody affair. By 1992, Armenian forces and Armenian-backed militias had occupied almost 20 percent of Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts. Millions of ethnic Azeris were kicked out of their homes and now live as internally displaced people. Tens of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were killed. As is the way with war, atrocities were committed by both sides.

A cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994 and the conflict has been described as “frozen” since then. However, four days of intense fighting in April 2016 left 200 dead. In early summer 2018, Azerbaijani forces successfully launched an operation to retake territory around Gunnut, a small village strategically located in the mountainous region of Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. These two incidents marked the only changes in territory since 1994.

Among international policymakers, especially in the West, a Nagorno-Karabakh “fatigue” has set in. Most policymakers shy away from the topic, believing that it is a local problem. This is naive in the extreme. 

Far from being just a localized conflict watched with curiosity by many on social media, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is actually a tangled web of competing geopolitical interests from across the region, including Russia, Iran and Turkey.

The risk of the war spilling over is real for two reasons. Firstly, there are regional powers playing a role behind the scenes. Top of this list is Russia. This conflict offers another opportunity for Moscow to exert influence and consolidate power in the region. While its sympathies lie with Armenia, Russia is the largest supplier of weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It also uses the instability in the region as an excuse to base more than 5,000 soldiers in Armenia, including with advanced armaments, air defense systems, and artillery.

Iran’s closeness with Azerbaijan’s archenemy Armenia also makes Baku nervous. During the Nagorno-Karabakh war in the early 1990s, Iran sided with Armenia as a way of marginalizing Azerbaijan’s role in the region. In 2019, Armenian-Iranian trade hit a record high. And Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said during a visit to Armenia last year: “We attach great importance to developing and expanding relations with our friend and neighbor Armenia in all areas.” 

Of course, for historic and cultural reasons, Turkey and Azerbaijan are very close. It has even been suggested that Russia decided to turn up the heat in the South Caucasus as a way to divert Turkish attention from places like Syria and Libya. With the amount of sway Moscow holds over Yerevan, this is completely possible. 

It does not take a great imagination to see how this local conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan could quickly become a regional one. 

The second reason why the conflict might spill over is the location of the most recent fighting. The village of Aghdam is mere kilometers from major oil and gas pipelines connecting the Caspian region in the heart of the Eurasian landmass to European and international energy markets. 

Looking at a map, one can see that there are only three ways for energy and trade to flow overland between Europe and Asia: Through Iran, Russia or Azerbaijan. With relations among the West, Moscow and Tehran in tatters, that leaves only one viable route for hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of trade — through Azerbaijan.

This small trade corridor, only 100 kilometers wide, is known as the “Ganja Gap” — named after Azerbaijan’s second-largest city and old Silk Road trading post Ganja, which is located in the region. The district where most of the recent fighting took place is right in the middle of the Ganja Gap.

Currently, there are three major oil and gas pipelines that crucially bypass Russia and Iran and pass through the Ganja Gap: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Baku-Supsa pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor. Fiber optic cables linking Western Europe with the Caspian region also pass through the Ganja Gap, as do an important motorway and rail link. Clearly, a major breakout in fighting could threaten the security of the Ganja Gap.

Russia knows that every ounce of oil and gas that

Europe imports from the Caspian region reduces its influence. If Russia wanted to use Armenia to turn up the heat in the region, there would be no better place to do so than the Ganja Gap.

It does not take a great imagination to see how this local conflict could quickly become a regional one.

Luke Coffey

Although it is not clear which side started the most recent episode of fighting, in the bigger picture this hardly matters. At the end of the day, it is still Armenian forces that are located on territory that the international community recognizes to be Azerbaijan’s. It was Armenia that invaded Azerbaijani territory in the early 1990s, not the other way around.

Until Armenian forces fully withdraw and Azerbaijan is able to restore sovereignty over its territories, this conflict will remain like the Sword of Damocles hanging over some of the most crucial oil and gas pipelines in the world.

Policymakers should not ignore the fighting, thinking it is a local problem. On the contrary, the international community should work together to find a lasting solution to this 32-year-old conflict. And the sooner the better. 

www.arabnews.com/node/1710806/amp

Armenian Actions in Tovuz Border District Threaten European Energy Security and Geopolitical Stability

28 July 2020 | By Dr. Ceyhun Osmanli

Protests by the Armenian Diaspora in Brussels last week turned violent, with a premeditated attack on the Azerbaijani Embassy. Similar incidents were orchestrated around the globe in what appears to have been a coordinated campaign of terror. In this opinion editorial, our guest correspondent Dr Ceyhun Osmanli warns of the dangers for Europe if this conflict continues to spiral out of control.

The Caucasus saw the worst hostilities in the last few years when the Armenian armed forces used distillery fire to attack the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on July 12th, writes Dr. Ceyhun Osmanli. 

The attack resulted in 12 Azerbaijani deaths, including a 75-year-old civilian, leaving 4 injured and causing serious damage to Azerbaijani border villages and farms.

Since 1993, Armenia has been occupying 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territory in Nagorno-Karabakh and its 7 surrounding districts despite calls from the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament for the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian troops. The recent attack demonstrates not only that Armenia has no intention to comply with international law but also intends to make further territorial gains in north-western Azerbaijan, which is far away from the conflict zone subject to peace talks under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. 

Although the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to power with the promise of a peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, he ended up joining the ranks of the Karabakh clan he had fiercely opposed, especially when it comes to foreign policy.  Facing an unprecedented health and economic crisis and large public criticism for its bad management of the pandemic, the Pashinyan government first clamped down on the opposition in violation of democratic principles. And now it seems that it is instrumentalising the escalation of tensions with Azerbaijan to further distract and silence critics with “new advantageous positions” in the Armenian Defence Minister Davit Tonoyan’s words. 

The recent attacks in Tovuz in addition to the unconstructive attitude of Armenia towards the mediation efforts co-chaired by the US, Russia and France ring the alarm bells for a more belligerent state of affairs in the Caucasus region. Not only did the current Armenian administration refuse to adhere to the OSCE framework agreement, which was agreed upon in principle, but asked for a start-over of peace negotiations from scratch. 

By dissimulating fake news about the instigators of the current conflict, Armenia is further seeking to mislead the international community, which shall once again be reminded that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in the loss of more than 30, 000 lives and in the displacement of about 1 million Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees.  Our young nation cannot afford another Khojaly massacre, where entire Azerbaijani villages with their women and children, were subject to ethnic cleansing.

Now, Armenia goes so far as to openly attempt to cut the lifeline of our economy by destabilising the Tovuz district.  The district is not only of strategic importance to Azerbaijan but also to Europe, as it provides energy and transport links to Georgia, Turkey and Europe for the Azerbaijani oil and gas as well as other export commodities.  Major infrastructure projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the main highway to the west run through the Tovuz district.  By cutting these strategic links, Armenia would not only harm Azerbaijani national interests but could hamper the smooth functioning of TANAP and TAP projects in the future, which are of vital importance for European energy diversification.  The destruction of critical Azerbaijani infrastructure has been a longstanding goal of Armenia and its former Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan had even openly threatened to strike Azerbaijan’s Mingachevir hydropower plant back in 2014. The current situation poses an existential threat to our country and cannot remain unreciprocated.

In fact, some 200,000 Azerbaijani citizens took it of the streets to demand the restoration of Nagorno-Karabakh following the recent incident.  Within one week after the attack, the Azerbaijani army registered more than 50,000 new volunteers. 

Unless both parties are brought back to the negotiating table and international pressure is mounted to stop the aggressive Armenian policy towards Azerbaijan, our country will not be able to embrace the much-awaited justice that it deserves.  The international community shall finally make Armenia comply with its international obligations and respect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in line with the UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 on Nagorno-Karabakh. It is commendable that the US Congress passed an amendment on July 21st on displaced and killed people from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova but the international community ought to take a yet tougher stance on these grave border and human rights violations. 

Otherwise, the region could find itself on the brink of an all-out war, bringing major regional actors at geopolitical odds, as was recently the case in other parts of the globe.  Now is the time for action and not for words, for the cost of inaction could turn out to be extremely high.  The issue at stake is not only Azerbaijan’s future but also the European energy security as well as its geopolitical stability. 

Border clashes unlikely to escalate into full conflict

29 July 2020

In brief 

  • Clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border have resulted in at least 18 deaths on both sides since mid-July.
  • Inflammatory rhetoric on both sides appears to be primarily aimed at distracting domestic audiences critical of each government’s handling of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis rather than at provoking a military escalation.
  • A full-fledged conflict is unlikely due to the presence of key strategic infrastructure in the region, as well as economic pressures in each country.
  • Without a long-term political accord between the two countries, low-level violence will likely continue in the coming months.

Background

Clashes broke out between Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers on the northern part of the countries’ shared border on 12 July. It remains unclear what triggered the fighting, which follows decades of intermittent violence since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh war between the two countries in 1994. Negotiations last year resulted in both countries declaring that they were “preparing their populations for peace”. After more than a year, little progress has been made to determine the status of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

The clashes mark the most deadly and sustained outbreak of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the Four-Day War in 2016. The latest confrontations have employed a broader array of weaponry and tactics, including drone and cyberattacks, compared to previous fighting. Unlike the 2016 clashes that took place along Nagorno-Karabakh’s line of contact, the recent fighting has so far remained isolated to a smaller, uncontested area on the northern side of the border. Armenian and Azerbaijani officials have also so far confirmed far fewer casualties despite already having fought for a longer period than in 2016.

Appealing to the domestic audience

Both governments have exchanged inflammatory statements, but this has not led to an escalation of violence. Baku has vowed to attack a nuclear power plant near Yerevan, while Armenian authorities have said that they may respond by occupying more contested territory. However, this hostile rhetoric has so far not led to an intensification of clashes. Following the initial announcement of 16 deaths on 14 July, Armenia has only confirmed the deaths of two more soldiers in the following weeks.

This aggressive rhetoric is probably aimed at appealing to domestic audiences rather than reflective of an intent to wage all-out war. Despite a coronavirus-related ban on mass gatherings, several thousand people protested in the Azerbaijani capital and other major cities on 15 July chanting “death to Armenians”. The high-turnout and spontaneous nature of these protests is demonstrative of the popular support for assertive action against Armenia. Both the Azerbaijani and the Armenian governments have used nationalist sentiment to rally support and consolidate their power. The threats are therefore likely primarily aimed at distracting the public rather than signalling intent for a sustained conflict.

Avoiding total war

Violent conflict in the region would threaten infrastructure that is vital to both countries’ economies. The area hosts strategically important roads as well as major oil and gas pipelines that serve as a corridor from the Caspian Sea to global markets. Both governments’ economies rely heavily on the hydrocarbon trade. Around 75 percent of Yerevan’s energy needs comes from oil and gas imports, while hydrocarbons form 90 percent of Baku’s exports.

Baku and Yerevan are unlikely to escalate the fighting to all-out war, particularly as both countries are under severe economic pressure. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan predict a GDP contraction of about 3.5 percent this year, while Baku is facing a 19-year low in oil prices. Protracted conflict would risk exacerbating the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis.

Protracted and high-casualty conflict in densely populated civilian areas is unlikely to generate widespread popular support in the long-term. There are hundreds of civilian settlements on either side of the border. Military authorities have so far only confirmed one civilian fatality, but any widening of the conflict would increase the risk of civilian casualties at a time when both governments already face domestic pressures over their responses to COVID-19.

Foreign powers backing Yerevan and Baku are unlikely to engage in long-term military intervention. The Turkish president has said that Ankara will stand by Azerbaijan and has announced joint military exercises with Baku. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has ordered large-scale military exercises in southwestern Russia. However, both Ankara and Moscow heavily rely upon access to the South Caucasus energy market. Directly or indirectly supporting military escalation would risk damaging the region’s vital energy infrastructure.

Outlook

Violence along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border is likely to continue. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan recorded regular ceasefire violations in the period following the Four-Day War in 2016 up until a few weeks ago. And the recent outbreak of violence 300 km to the north of Nagorno-Karabakh shows the volatility of the entire Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Isolated and low-casualty clashes will therefore probably continue in border areas, even outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. These will aim to influence political agendas and public opinion at a threshold that does not provoke disruptive international intervention. Foreign powers may successfully mediate a ceasefire in the short term, but a longer-term political resolution of the decades-old conflict appears unlikely.

Resolution of the wider disagreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unlikely for the foreseeable future. The outbreak of violence exemplifies the failure of political negotiations so far and has pushed back the peace process on Nagorno-Karabakh. While neither government is likely to escalate the conflict amid the COVID-19-related economic downturn, both governments have domestic incentives to not pursue peace either.

Russia and Turkey: Behind the Armenia-Azerbaijan Clashes?

By Avinoam Idan

August 31, 2020, the CACI Analyst

The violent gunfire that erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July appears to have no connection with the ongoing conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This event took place far from Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Tovuz region. The strategic importance of the Tovuz region is its location on the energy export pipelines route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey and Western markets. It would seem that the players involved here are none other than Russia and Turkey, in active conflict vis-a-vis the war in Libya. The gunfire can be interpreted as a Russian message to Turkey, regarding its energy supply security from the Caspian Sea. If so, this is not the first time Russia has used Armenia to further its interests in the region.  

BACKGROUND: The recent exchange of gunfire lasted for three days in mid-July, along the northern border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The incident included artillery, tank fire and drone involvement, causing military casualties, as well as affecting villages on both sides of the border. Such incidents are not uncommon. The roots of this conflict stem back to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of independent states and to the controversy over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The war lasted four years, in which Russia actively aided Armenia in gaining control. Despite international recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including through UN Security Council decisions during the war itself, on the ground Armenia continues to de facto control the region to this day, including occupied territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh, with active military, political and economic support from Russia.

The event which took place in July is unusual because of its geographic location, in the region of Tovuz, near the meeting point of the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.  This is far from the disputed area, which lies far to the south. Most of the military clashes over the years have taken place along the line of control close to Nagorno-Karabakh or the occupied territories surrounding it, and have been aimed at moving the border and gaining control over parts of the disputed region. Pointedly, they have not taken place on the international border between Armenia proper and Azerbaijan.  Both countries have resisted broadening the area of conflict, for fear of losing international support, and neither country has shown interest in expanding the conflict beyond the disputed area.

During the height of the fighting, Russia began delivering military supplies to Armenia, and launched unannounced snap military exercises beginning on July 17. Russian arms deliveries to Armenia are nothing new, but the timing – during an episode of direct hostilities – is unprecedented. Before the end of July, Russia operated eight Ilyushin-76 flights to Armenia with military supplies. Because Georgia refused overflight rights, these flights were forced to use the circuitous route through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to reach Armenia. These supplies led President Ilham Aliyev to register his unhappiness directly with President Vladimir Putin.

The special importance of the geographic location of these clashes is its proximity to energy export pipelines, and their importance to Turkey, the main destination of these pipelines. Thus Russia’s involvement becomes clearer, and raises the question whether this event marks an indirect message from Russia to Turkey.   

IMPLICATIONS: The violence in the region of Tovuz is, it seems, in actuality reflects a clash between Russia and Turkey, wherein Russia used Armenia as leverage in its confrontation with Turkey. It would seem that the Russian initiative was meant to be a message to Turkey vis-à-vis the energy export infrastructure crossing the Caucasus to At the time of the incident itself, the Russian news agency TASS quoted a source from Gazprom Armenia, a subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom, reporting that some of their pipelines had been damaged during the incident. That was enough to justify Russia’s involvement, and Russian foreign Minister Lavrov met with representatives of both sides. The following day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged that that Turkey would support Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. Turkey’s staunch support of Baku was aimed, this time, not only at Armenia, but at Moscow, inviting a response, and a response there was. Presidents Putin and Erdogan had a telephone conversation ten days after the event to discuss the escalation of the situation along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Putin expressed his willingness to coordinate efforts to bring about stability in the area, and the two presidents opened a direct dialogue, beyond the scope of Armenia and Azerbaijan, centered on stability in the Caucasus, opening the door to broader issues.

The pipelines transiting the area supply Turkey with energy for its own use, as well as turning Turkey into a transit state for energy for Europe. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline crosses the region of Tovuz in Azerbaijan, as well areas in southern Georgia, finally reaching the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea. From there, the energy is exported to world markets. In parallel goes the route of the natural gas pipeline, the “Southern Corridor,” transports natural gas from the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan, through Georgia and Turkey, which is a key transit state to Europe. The Trans-Anatolian pipeline is complete, and its extension to Europe will soon be finished as well.

Russia and Turkey both have a stake in the civil war in Libya, creating the developing tension between them. The fact that each of these powers supports and supplies active military aid to a different side in the Libyan civil conflict, helps explain the incident along the Azerbaijani and Armenian northern border.

It is clear that the conflict between Russia and Turkey in Libya is focused on energy and on Libya’s geographic location. Libya contains huge proven oil reserves and is considered number nine in the world in this respect. In addition, its geographic location is crucial to both regional powers, since it lies along the Mediterranean coast, not far from Europe, including several Libyan ports. Both Russia and Turkey are vying for control of these oil fields and for possible control of these ports. This would provide the key to achieving a strategic position in the Mediterranean and convenient access to oil and gas discoveries in the area. Turkey appears already to be taking steps to achieve a presence in Libyan ports, a dominant position in Libya and has reached an agreement with the Tripoli-based Libyan government concerning the division of subsoil assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. This agreement challenges Russia, which has considered itself the reigning power in the eastern Mediterranean ever since it established itself in Syria, another area where Turkish and Russian interests have clashed. 

CONCLUSIONS: The ever-increasing confrontation between Russia and Turkey in Libya, as well as that in the Eastern Mediterranean, may well continue to have a significant influence on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This was already the case several years ago, when Turkey short down a Russian fighter jet on its border with Syria, something that led Russia to deploy military helicopters to Armenia.  The latest incident may seem to be unrelated to the ongoing conflict regarding natural gas, but it brings this point home. The major energy transport infrastructure from the Caspian Sea to Turkey passes through Azerbaijani territory and is under potential threat from Armenia. Russia has the ability to effectively influence Armenia, which is greatly dependent on Russia for its economic and military wellbeing. This situation provides Russia with leverage over Turkey, both economic and geostrategic. This has become especially obvious since Azerbaijan replaced Russia as Turkey’s major gas provider, as well as the fact that it has become an important transit state from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and Europe. Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean are of extreme strategic importance to Russia. Therefore, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict may well serve as a means in Russia’s hands to enhance its standing vis-à-vis Turkey.

https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13636-russia-and-turkey-behind-the-armenia-azerbaijan-clashes?.html

Russian military shipments to Armenia – a dangerous escalation?

31 August 2020 | By Esmira Jafarova

Has Russia abandoned its role of impartial mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict? Esmira Jafarova analyses recent developments.

The 12-16 July clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan were the worst since the April War in 2016. The military provocation unleashed by Armenia against Azerbaijan along the international border in the direction of Tovuz district left dozens of servicemen killed on both sides, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian from the Azerbaijani side.

International actors, including the European UnionOSCE Minsk GroupUnited Nations, the United States, and the Russian Federation, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Experts have shared their estimations of the motives behind Armenia’s next military provocation, that include firstly, an attempt to drag the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) into the conflict with Azerbaijan by invoking Article 4 about the collective self-defence;  secondly, an intention to target critical energy infrastructure built by Azerbaijan and its international partners, that are passing nearby Tovuz area; thirdly, an attempt to divert attention from its own internal problems.

Although the situation is now seemingly stable, Azerbaijan expresses a caution that it expects provocations by Armenia at any time along the border.

Indeed, just very recently, Armenia ramped up its reconnaissance and sabotage activities along the front line and on 23 August Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense reported catching First Lieutenant Gurgin Alberyan, the commander of the Armenian sabotage group.

Moreover, over the last months, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense also reported destroying Armenia’s several tactical UAVs that attempted to carry out flights over the positions of the units of the Azerbaijani Army. These developments keep the situation tense and unpredictable.

However, what adds more fuel to the fire in this grim and potentially explosive picture is the news about the role played by the Russian Federation, one of the three co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group tasked to mediate the resolution of the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict, in arming Armenia.

As soon as the active military fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July subsided, reports surfaced containing information on Russia’s military shipments to Armenia. It was reported that nine flights in total were performed from the Russian Federation to Armenia amidst the July clashes and also after the fighting ceased.

On top of this, in recent weeks, increased traffic of flights on the route Rostov-Mineralnye Vody-Aktau-Turkmenbashi-Novoshehr-Rasht-Meghri-Yerevan and back was registered with more than 510 tons of military cargo delivered from the Russian Federation to Armenia by IL-76 military-transport planes.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, over a telephone conversation with President Vladimir Putin, raised concern over the intensified military shipment by the Russian Federation to Armenia against the backdrop of military clashes in July.

In an attempt to explain these suspicious developments related to arms shipments to Armenia, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, during his meeting with President Ilham Aliyev within a visit to Baku on 25 August to participate in the “Sea Cup” international contest, noted that those shipments to Armenia actually contained construction materials for Russia’s military base in Gyumri, Armenia.

However, Shoigu’s explanation failed to convince the sceptics.

Hikmat Hajiyev, the Foreign Policy Adviser to President Ilham Aliyev, also noted:

“Azerbaijani public is worried about the delivery of shipments from the Russian Federation to Armenia. We would like to hear more explanations on these shipments. During Tovuz attacks in July Armenia once again demonstrated that it is committed to its expansionist and occupational policy. We are not satisfied with the answer that these shipments contained construction materials. Obviously, construction materials could have been delivered via other means, too”.

Russia’s arms supply to Armenia are happening against the background of an already existing solid strategic military partnership between the two countries. Armenia hosts Russia’s 102th military base in Gyumri, 3624th airbase in its territories and relies on Russia’s military support for multiple purposes.

Moreover, the repeated free of charge delivery of military equipment from the Russian Federation to Armenia over the years, alongside the very recent delivery of Iskander missiles to the latter may cast a shadow to Russia’s role as an objective and non-tendentious mediator in the lingering conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

For many observers, Armenia would not have been able to sustain the occupation of Azerbaijani territories without decades-long military support from Moscow. Therefore, the opinions of those who believe that Russia might have ulterior geopolitical motives behind extending military support to Armenia may override.

For instance, “Musavat”, an Azerbaijani media agency, asserts that the Russian Federation arms Armenia to attack Azerbaijan as part of its strategy to strengthen its grip over the South Caucasus and keep Turkey completely outside of the region.

Others also believe that by keeping Azerbaijan and Armenia at war, Russia aims to keep them on a short leash, thereby maintaining its clout over the regional affairs. However, there are also those who claim that Russia is indeed a genuinely neutral meditator and does not pick sides in this thorny confrontation.

Actually, the history of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has witnessed a good deal of successful good offices by the Russian Federation, including the ceasefire deal of 1994 and ending the Four-Day War in April 2016, that were all brokered by Moscow.

The Russian Federation is an active member of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship institute and has facilitated bilateral meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani sides on numerous occasions.

Hopefully, these questionable and worrying developments related to Russia’s military shipments to Armenia will soon be clarified as one does not wish to assume that the Russian Federation has chosen to abandon its role as an unbiased mediator in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in favour of pandering to Armenia’s provocations.

Dangerous trends in Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict

31 July 2020 | By Vasif Huseynov

Although it currently seems that there is “relative calm” on the border, Armenia and Azerbaijan continue fighting verbally on the social media and, more dangerously, physically in foreign countries where they have settled, writes Vasif Huseynov.

There have been few moments in the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict more confrontational than now since the two countries signed the Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement in May 1994.

Due to the failure of internationally-mediated negotiations, the two nations could not resolve their territorial disputes over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan during the last three decades and found themselves at loggerheads in almost every single detail of the proposed settlement formulations.

On 12-14 July, this caused a major military confrontation between the armed forces of the two countries on their internationally-recognized borders, in a geographical spot far from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, resulted in the loss of up to 20 military servicemen on both sides.

The skirmishes were so intense that many observers alarmed that the two countries might end up in a full-scale war with catastrophic humanitarian and other consequences for the region.

Although it currently seems that there is “relative calm” on the border, the two nations continue fighting verbally on the social media and, more dangerously, physically in foreign countries where they have settled.

One of the first such clashes in international cities was reported to have occurred in London on 17 July. The peaceful rally of Azerbaijanis in front of the Armenian embassy in London was confronted by the counter-protest of Armenians.

Soon their verbal attacks transformed into violent fighting between the two groups with one Azerbaijani protestor injured. There were demonstrations by the diaspora of the two countries in other European cities on 17-18 July but accompanied by no provocation or clashes.

Azerbaijani people in Hungary, Austria, and Germany took to the streets and peacefully protested the occupation of part of Azerbaijani territories by Armenians. The protesters chanted the slogans “No to terror,” “Stop Armenian aggression,” and “Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan”.

The protests in some other places, however, did not pass in peace and violence broke out between the two sides.

For instance, in Los Angeles, a Californian city that hosts the largest Armenian community outside Armenia, more than 500 Armenian protestors faced off with an Azerbaijani group of much smaller size (less than 50 people) near the Azerbaijan Consulate General.

According to the local investigators, “two opposing groups increasingly agitated which turned into a physical altercation”. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is currently investigating three hate crime and battery incidents after three people from the Azerbaijani group sustained non-life-threatening injuries.

For U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Earle Litzenberger, there is irrefutable evidence that the provocation in Los Angeles was committed by aggressive Armenian demonstrators.

The Azerbaijani community in the region is particularly worried by the subsequent calls of some Armenian social media users to “locate any Turkish or Azeri Californians”. The Azerbaijani Consulate in Los Angeles wrote on Twitter that “it might be an intimidation campaign by some radical and aggressive Armenian groups” and as such, they have reported them to the LAPD.

They called the Los Angeles authorities to take proper measures to ensure the security of the Azerbaijani community and to send message to all radical groups that violence targeting any community in Los Angeles will not be tolerated.

The threat to the Azerbaijani and also Turkish community in the United States needs to be deemed seriously as some of the Armenian protestors elsewhere appeared to be supportive of the ASALA, an Armenian movement that has killed more than 70 people, including 24 Turkish diplomats, and recognized as a terrorist organization by many countries, including the United States.

The protests of Azerbaijani and Armenian ethnic groups in Brussels also resulted in violence, in a more dramatic scale. On 22 July, the Armenian community in Belgium took to the streets in front of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan and were confronted by the representatives of the Azerbaijani community.

According to the statement, the Embassy issued afterwards, “As a result of the attack of the Armenian aggressors with stones and sharp cutting tools and explosives, 6 members of the Azerbaijani Diaspora, as well as the correspondent of the European bureau of “REAL TV” Khatira Sardargizi were injured and received medical treatment.

Employees of the diplomatic mission were injured, there was destruction in the mission’s administrative building, windows were broken, the car of a member of the Azerbaijani community was damaged, and an attempt was made to attack the area where the diplomats’ family members live.”

It is reported that 17 Armenian protestors were subsequently detained by the Belgium law enforcement agencies.

The video footages from the clashes between the two ethnic groups are widely shared on social media infuriating the members of two nations and provoking them into more violence. One of such videos originally posted online by an Armenian living in Brussels depicted a group of Armenians brutally beating an Azerbaijani young man.

The video was shared by thousands of Azerbaijani social media users some of whom called for retaliation against Armenians. Similar incidents continue to be reported in many other parts of the world, including Russia where Azerbaijani and Armenian people have settled in large numbers.

Important to note that many cool-headed Azerbaijanis advised their compatriots to report the criminals to local police and get them punished in accordance with the law and norms of the respective states.

However, when tensions soar this high, it runs the risk of spiralling out of control as it is mostly impossible to regulate the process when it is dominated by nationalism and demands for revenge.

The situation between the two nations has, thus, reached alarming levels and spilled over diasporas in the third countries. The status-quo with the occupied territories of Azerbaijan might ignite further escalations in the future.

This is the reason why the international mediators should intervene immediately and push sides for substantive negotiations. The emphasis on “substantive” is crucial as the negotiations between the two countries have become “pointless” in recent years.

Last year, while the front line saw the significant reductions in casualties, no progress was achieved at the negotiation table.

The Azerbaijani government laments that “no achievements have been made at all” in the negotiation process which is why they call for more tangible contribution from the OSCE’s Minsk Group that is the main international institution tasked with the coordination of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and other international organizations.